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War with France.

OFFICIAL PAPERS,

PRESENTED

BY HIS MAJESTY'S COMMAND

TO

BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT,

On Wednesday, the 18th of May, 1803,

RELATIVE TO THE NEGOCIATION BETWEEN GREAT
BRITAIN AND THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT.

D U B L I N:

PRINTED BY J. SHEA, 42, COLLEGE-GREEN.

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State Papers, &c.

Translation of No. 1.

London, May 23, 1802.

My Lord—The 10th article of the Treaty of Amiens which fixes the new organization of the Order of Malta, having prescribed various measures, to the execution of which it is necessary that the two principal Contracting Powers should concur, the First Consul has named General Vial as Minister Plenipotentiary to the Order and Island of Malta, for the purpose of concerting with the person whom his Britannic Majesty shall appoint for that purpose, respecting the execution of the arrangements agreed upon in the late Treaty. General Vial will set out on his destination as soon as your Excellency shall have informed me of his Majesty's intentions, and of the choice he may make.

I have the honour to be, &c.

OTTO.

No. 2.

Downing-street, May 24, 1802.

Sir—In answer to your letter of yesterday, in which you communicate to me the nomination, by the First Consul, of General Vial to be Minister Plenipotentiary of the French Republic, to the Order of Saint John of Jerusalem; I have the honour to inform you that the King has been pleased to appoint Sir Alexander Ball to be his Majesty's Minister to the Order. Sir Alexander Ball will shortly proceed to Malta, and will be instructed to concert with General Vial the necessary measures for carrying into effect the arrangements relative to that Island, which are stipulated in the 10th article of the Definitive Treaty of Peace. I have the honour to be, &c.

M. Otto, &c. &c. &c.

HAWKESBURY.

No. 3.—Extract of a Dispatch from Lord St. Helens to Lord Hawkesbury, dated St. Petersburg, April 23, 1802.

I hope very soon to be enabled to re-dispatch your Lordship's last Messenger with the answer of this government to the Communications which I have made to them, in obedience to his Majesty's commands, respecting the tenth article of the treaty of Amiens. In the mean time I must not conceal from your Lordship, that there is great reason to fear that his Imperial Majesty will decline taking part in the proposed joint gauranty of the possessions and new Constitution of the Order of Malta.

No.

No. 4.—Extract of a dispatch from Lord St. Helens to Lord Hawkeſbury, dated Peterſburgh, May 7, 1802.

I have reaſon to hope, that the firſt impreſſions that had been produced here by certain parts of the arrangement relative to Malta, have been removed; and that his Imperial Maſteſty may even be ultimately induced to gauranty the whole of that arrangement; provided that the ſteps which have been taken towards the election of a new Grand Maſter, according to the mode ſuggeſted by this Court, be conſidered as fulfilling what is required on that head by the latter part of the paragraph of the tenth article of the Treaty of Amiens; and conſequently that no new election for that Office is to take place in the manner pointed out by the former part of the ſame ſtipulation.

No. 5.

Downing-ſtreet, June 5, 1802.

Sir—I informed you that M. Otto had made an official communication to me, that General Vial was appointed by the Firſt Conſul Miniſter Plenipotentiary to the Order of St. John of Jeruſalem. Sir Alexander Ball has been in conſequence inveſted with the ſame character by his Maſteſty. He will proceed immediately to Malta, and he will receive inſtructions to concert with General Vial the beſt means of carrying into complete effect the ſtipulations contained in the 10th Article of the Definitive Treaty. By the paragraph marked No. 1. in that Article, it is ſtipulated:

“The Knights of the Order, whoſe langues ſhall continue to ſubſiſt after the exchange of the Ratifications of the preſent Treaty, are invited to return to Malta as ſoon as that exchange ſhall have taken place: They ſhall there form a General Chapter, and ſhall proceed to the election of a Grand Maſter, to be choſen from amongſt the natives of thoſe nations which preſerve langues, if no ſuch election ſhall have been already made ſince the exchange of the Ratifications of the Preliminary Articles of Peace.”

The object of this paragraph was, that in the event of an election having taken place ſubſequent to the exchange of the Ratification of the Preliminary Articles of Peace, and antecedent to the concluſion of the Definitive Treaty, that election ſhould be conſidered as valid; and though no mention is made in the article of the proclamation of the Emperor of Ruſſia ſoon after his Acceſſion to the Throne, by which the Knights of the Order were invited to aſſemble, and to proceed to the election of a Grand Maſter, the ſtipulation in queſtion evidently referred to the contingency of an election taking place on the Continent in conſequence of that proclamation.

You will inform the French Government, that his Maſteſty is ready to conſider the election which has lately taken place at St. Peterſburgh, under the auſpices of the Emperor of Ruſſia, to be valid, according to the ſtipulation in the 10th Article.

His

His Majesty has no other object in the whole of this transaction, than that the 10th Article of the Treaty may be fairly executed; and that the arrangement may be carried into complete execution with as little difficulty as possible.

As the 13th paragraph in the 10th Article stipulates that the Government of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, should be invited to accede to the arrangements respecting Malta, it is desirable that the French Government should instruct, without delay, their Ambassadors or Ministers at Vienna, Petersburg and Berlin, to make, conjointly, with his Majesty's Ministers at those Courts, an official communication, desiring the accession of those Powers to the arrangement relative to Malta in the Definitive Treaty; by which it is provided that the independence of the island and the other stipulations, shall be under the guarantee of those Powers, in conjunction with his Majesty, the French Government, and the King of Spain. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

" HAWKESBURY.

Anthony Merry, &c. &c."

No. 6—Extract of a Dispatch from Anthony Merry, Esq. to Lord Hawkesbury, Dated Paris, June 17, 1802.

I have now the honour to transmit to your Lordship, inclosed, copy of an answer which reached me last night, (though dated eight days back), from the French Minister, to the note verbale which I delivered to him, containing his Majesty's propositions respecting the execution of some points of the arrangements relative to Malta, contained in the 10th Article of the definitive Treaty of Peace. You will find the entire acquiescence of this Government to those propositions, expressed in a very satisfactory manner,

(Inclosure referred to in No. 6.)

His Britannic Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary has the honour to transmit herewith to Citizen Talleyrand, Minister for the Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, the "Note Verbale" of the communication he has been ordered to make to him by his Government, who are desirous that the proposals it contains may be acceptable to the French Government; and they may be assured, that the British Government, in making these proposals, have no other object in view than to facilitate, in the easiest manner, the execution of the Treaty of Amiens, and to act in this respect in perfect harmony with the French Government.

Mr. Merry has the honour to renew, on this occasion, the assurances of his high consideration for M. Talleyrand.

(Signed)

ANT. MERRY.

Paris, 8th June, 1802.

The Citizen Minister for Foreign Affairs will find inclosed a list of suffrages obtained from several Priories of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, for the election of a Grand Master, which has been received from St. Petersburg by the British Govern-

ment, with the notice that these Priorities have agreed among themselves, that his Holiness the Pope shall select (pro hac vice), from amongst the Candidates therein specified, the Person who is to fill the post of Grand Master.

His Britannic Majesty on his part, is willing to consider an election so made as valid, according to the stipulations of the 10th Article of the Treaty of Amiens.

His Majesty therefore is ready to acknowledge, in quality of Grand Master, the person whom the Pope shall think proper to fix upon, from amongst the names contained in that list.

His Majesty has no other end in view in this than to see the 10th article of the Treaty of Amiens duly fulfilled, and the arrangement it contains executed with as little difficulty as possible.

It is stipulated by the 13th paragraph of the same article, that the Austrian, Russian, and Prussian Governments, shall be solicited to accede to the said arrangement.

The British Government is of opinion that it might be proper for that of France to send without delay instructions to their Ministers at Vienna, Petersburg, and Berlin, to make conjointly with his Britannic Majesty's Ministers a communication to those Powers, in which they should be invited to accede to the arrangement respecting Malta, by which the independence of the island, and the other stipulations relative thereto, are placed under the protection and guarantee of those powers conjointly with their Britannic and Catholic Majesties, and the French Republic.

Translation.

The undersigned, Minister for Foreign Affairs, has the honour to transmit to M. Merry, his Britannic Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary, his answer to the Note Verbale which he addressed to him on the Eighth Prairial. He doubts not that his Majesty's Ministers will see in this answer a new proof of the constant dispositions of the First Consul to come to an agreement with the English Government, for the securing and facilitating the execution of the respective clauses of the treaty which has re established peace between the two States.

The Undersigned has the honour to renew to M. Merry the assurance of his high consideration.

(Signed)

CHAU. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

Paris, 20th Prairial, Year 10.

[The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic has received the communication which has been made to him by his Britannic Majesty's Ministers Plenipotentiary, of the list of the candidates nominated by the Votes of the different Priorities to the Grand Mastership of the Order of Malta; and he has submitted to the First Consul the proposal concerted between the Priorities of the Order, and approved by his Britannic Majesty,

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of submitting (pro hac vice) to his Holiness the choice among the proposed candidates.

The First Consul has no other object in whatever relates to the Order of Malta, than to see the 10th Article of the Treaty of Amiens duly executed, and to remove all the obstacles which might render that execution tardy or difficult. He moreover desires equally with his Britannic Majesty, that France and England should act in concert, in order the better to secure the independence and the organisation of the Order of Malta. He therefore consents that the choice of its Grand Master, from the candidates proposed by the Votes of the Priories, should for the time be submitted to his Holiness.

As to the 13th paragraph of the same Article, respecting the accession of the Powers, the First Consul thinks with his Britannic Majesty, that the Powers should be invited to give their consent to the arrangements agreed upon; and the French Ministers at the Courts of Austria, Russia, and Prussia shall consequently receive orders to take, conjointly with his Britannic Majesty's Ministers, the necessary steps for obtaining the accession provided by the 10th Article, of the Treaty of Amiens.]

Paris, 10th of Prairial Year 10.

No. 7.

Paris, June 4, 1802.

MY LORD--I had occasion to see M. Talleyrand yesterday afternoon, for the purpose of introducing to him, by appointment, some English Gentlemen, previously to their presentation to-day to the First Consul.

Having gone first alone into the Minister's Cabinet, he said, that he had been directed by General Bonaparte, to represent to me several circumstances which stood very much in the way of that perfect reconciliation and good understanding between the two Countries and their Governments, which it was the First Consul's sincere wish to see re-established, in order that such obstacles might be removed before the arrival in London of the French Ambassador; because although the circumstances in question, had already produced a very disagreeable effect, whilst only M. Otto, as Minister, had to witness them, they would acquire a great addition of force if they should still exist when the Ambassador should be present; and since the First Consul had given orders for General Andreossi to proceed to his destination with as little delay as possible, he wished that I should take an early opportunity to give an account to your Lordship of the observations which he was charged to make to me.

After a preface to this effect, M. Talleyrand proceeded to state to me, that the accounts which M. Otto had transmitted of the disgust and inconvenience which he could not but feel and experience at meeting frequently at his Majesty's Court and at other places, the French Princes, and some French persons still decorated with the Insignia of French Orders which no longer existed;

existed; and at seeing the countenance and support which continued to be given in England, to what he termed the *ci devant* French Bishops, as well as to other Persons (he here mentioned Georges) inimical to the present Government of France, had affected so strongly the First Consul, and were in fact so calculated to prevent that system of cordiality which he was anxious to see established, that it was incumbent upon him to express his wish, that his Majesty's Government might be disposed to remove out of the British Dominions, all the French Princes and their adherents, together with the French Bishops, and other French individuals whose political principles and conduct must necessarily occasion great jealousy to the French Government. He continued to observe, that the protection and favour which all the persons in question continued to meet with, in a Country so close a neighbour to France, must aloné be always considered as an encouragement to the disaffected here, even without those persons themselves being guilty of any acts tending to foment fresh disturbances in this Country; but that the Government here, possessed proofs of the abuse which they were now making of the protection which they enjoyed in England, and of the advantage they were taking of the vicinity of their situation to France, by being really guilty of such acts, since several printed papers had lately been intercepted; which it was known they had sent, and caused to be circulated in France, and which had for object, to create an opposition to the Government. I cannot, my Lord, do better than refer you to what you will have read in the French official paper of the day before yesterday, under the Article of Paris, for the exact text of M. Talleyrand's discourse upon this subject, which he concluded by saying, that he thought the residence of Louis the XVIII. was now the proper place for that of the rest of the family, and that I might add this suggestion in my report to your lordship.

I answered the French Minister, that without any reference to you, I could assure him that the practises of the French residing in England, of which he complained, had not been encouraged, nor would be countenanced by his Majesty's Government, which was as sincerely disposed to cultivate harmony and a good understanding between the two countries, as he had represented the First Consul to be; but that I could by no means say how far they would be disposed to adopt the measures which he had intimated it to be General Bonaparte's wish that they should pursue, in order to remove so effectually every thing which might not perhaps be considered equally by them, as giving just cause of offence or jealousy to France.

M. Talleyrand did not rejoin upon the matter; but asked me when I proposed writing. Upon my replying I should lose no time, he said, that if I should write as to-day, he would avail himself

himself of the opportunity to convey a letter to M. Otto. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) A. MERRY.

Right Honourable Lord Hawkesbury, &c. &c. &c.

No 8.

Downing-street, June 10, 1802.

Sir—Your dispatches of the 4th instant were received on Monday night, and have been laid before the King.

The account given in that dispatch of the conversation which passed on the 3d instant, between you and M. Talleyrand, respecting the French Princes and their adherents, would have afforded here considerable surprise, if his Majesty's Government had not in some degree been prepared for it by information which had been previously received: from the manner, however, in which this subject has been mentioned to you, it is important that you should take a proper opportunity to explain candidly and fairly to the French Government the line of conduct which his Majesty feels it to be his duty to pursue in this very delicate business. His Majesty would certainly consider it inconsistent with both the letter and spirit of the treaty of peace, between him and the French Republic, to encourage or countenance any projects that might be hostile to the present Government of France. He is sincerely desirous that the peace which has been concluded may be permanent, and may lead to the establishment of a system of good understanding and harmony between the two countries. With these sentiments he is disposed to employ all the means in his power to guard against any circumstance which can have the effect of disturbing the tranquillity that has been so happily restored; and he certainly expects that all foreigners who may reside within his dominions, should not only hold a conduct conformable to the laws of the country, but should abstain from attempting what may be hostile to the Government of any country with which his Majesty may be at peace. As long, however, as they conduct themselves according to these principles, his Majesty would feel it inconsistent with his dignity, with his honour, and with the common laws of hospitality, to deprive them of that protection which individuals resident in his dominions can only forfeit by their own misconduct. The greater part of persons to whom allusion has been made in M. Talleyrand's conversation with you, are living in retirement, and his Majesty has no reason whatever to suppose that since the conclusion of peace they have availed themselves of their residence in this country to promote any designs injurious to the Government of France. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

HAWKESBURY.

Anthony Merry, Esq, &c. &c. &c.

(No. 9.)

Paris, June 17, 1802.

My Lord—I have the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that I have executed the instructions given me by your secret and confidential dispatch (No. 14.) in consequence of the communication

cation from M. Talleyrand, which I transmitted in my Number 23, respecting the residence of the French Princes, and other French persons in his Majesty's dominions.

In delivering my answer on this business to the French Minister, I took care to express, in the strongest manner, the assurances which your Lordship has authorized me to give of his Majesty's sincere desire that the peace which has happily been concluded should be permanent, and that it should lead to the establishment of a system of harmony and good understanding between the two countries; and that, as his majesty's conduct would, in every respect, be guided by those sentiments, he of course would not tolerate, much less encourage, any proceedings on the part of persons within his dominions, which might be hostile to the present Government of France; which assurances might, I trusted, be sufficient to tranquillize and satisfy the First Consul, without recurring to the measures which had been intimated to me, and which could not but be considered as inconsistent with his majesty's dignity and honour, as well as with the common laws of hospitality, which he could not but observe towards foreigners within his dominions, until they should have forfeited that protection by their misconduct.

M. Talleyrand expressed to me in reply, that the First Consul had solicited no more than the British Government itself had, at the time, demanded of France, when the Pretender was in this Country, and then had been practised between other Governments under similar circumstances: that he could not see any humiliation in the measure which he had intimated to me; that he could assure me it had not been suggested with any such idea: and that he could only repeat, that the adoption of it would be in the highest degree agreeable and satisfactory to the First Consul, and be considered by him as the most convincing proof of his majesty's disposition to see a cordial good understanding established between the two Countries; concluding his answer with a request that I would report it to your Lordship.

I rejoined upon the subject by observing to the French minister, that even without adverting to the serious consideration of the King's dignity and honour, the feelings of the people of England were to be taken into account on the occasion: that he must be sensible the relative situation hitherto, of the two Countries, especially in regard to trade, afforded his majesty's subjects no room to reap those advantages which were common to, and which were always expected from a state of peace, and that it therefore appeared to me that the First Consul would equally give a proof of his disposition to see harmony and a friendly intercourse re established between the two Nations, by not repeating his wish upon a matter which would operate in the strongest manner against such an approximation and reconciliation of sentiments, were it even only to come to the knowledge of his majesty's subjects.

I am happy, my Lord, to say, that M. Talleyrand shewed no warmth, or any very marked eagerness, in his manner of replying to my communication; and that our conversation on this head terminated with the last remarks I made to him, when he changed it to another subject. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

ANTHONY MERRY.

Right Hon. Lord Hawkebury, &c. &c. &c.

Translation of No. 13. Portman-square, July 25, 1802.

My Lord—I transmitted some time ago, to Mr. Hammond, a number of Peltier, containing the most gross calumnies against the French Government, and against the whole nation; and I observed, that I should probably receive an order to demand the punishment of such an abuse of the Press. That order is actually arrived, and I cannot conceal from you, my Lord, that the reiterated insults of a small number of Foreigners, assembled in London to conspire against the French Government, produce the most unfavourable effects; on the good understanding between the two nations. Even though the first article of the Treaty of Amiens had not provided for the maintenance of that respect, which two independent nations owe to each other; the general maxims of the law of nations would formally condemn so revolting an abuse of the liberty of the Press. It cannot be believed that the law would give more latitude to a libellist than to any other individual, who, without declaration of war, should permit himself to violate the duties of good neighbourhood. The offence in question is so much the more serious; as its object is evidently to disturb the harmony which subsists between the two Governments.

It is not to Peltier alone, but to the editor of the “*Courier de Londres*,” to Cobbet, and to other writers who resemble them, that I have to direct the attention of his Majesty’s government. The perfidious and malevolent publications of these men, are in open contradiction to the principles of peace, and if it could ever enter into the mind of the French Government to permit retaliation, writers would doubtless be found in France, willing to avenge their countrymen by filling their pages with odious reflections on the most respectable persons, and on the dearest institutions of Great Britain.

The want of positive laws against these sorts of offences cannot palliate the violation of the law of nations, according to which peace should put a stop to all species of hostilities; and doubtless those which wound the honour and reputation of a government, and which tend to cause a revolt of the people, whose interests are confided to that government, are the most apt to lessen the advantages of peace, and to keep up national resentments.

I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed)

OTTO.

To his Excellency Lord Hawkebury, Minister and Secretary of State for the Foreign Department.

No. 11.

Downing-street, July 28, 1802.

Sir—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter on the subject of the last number of *Peltier*. It is impossible that his Majesty's government could peruse the article in question without the greatest displeasure, and without an anxious desire that the person who published it should suffer the punishment he so justly deserves. The calumnies, however, to which his Majesty's government, and many of the best subjects in this country, are frequently exposed in the public prints, must necessarily convince all foreign governments of the difficulties which exist in a constitution like that of Great Britain, in preventing the abuse which is often unavoidably attendant on the greatest of all political benefits; and though publications of this nature are, as they certainly ought to be, by the law of England, subject to punishment, it is often difficult to prove the guilt of an individual so satisfactorily as to obtain the judgment of a court of justice; and the inconvenience which arises from prosecution, unless there is a reasonable prospect of success, is frequently sufficient to deter both the government and individuals from undertaking it. In the present case I have thought it my duty to refer the article in question to his Majesty's Attorney General, for his opinion, whether it is or is not a libel, according to the construction of the law of England, and whether it is such a libel as he would, under all the circumstances, recommend for prosecution? As soon as I receive his report, I shall have the honour of communicating it to you. I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) HAWKESBURY.

M. Otto, &c. &c. &c.

Translation of No. 12.—NOTE.

The undersigned Minister Plenipotentiary of the French Republic having submitted to his Government the letter which his Excellency Lord Hawkesbury, Minister and Principal Secretary of State of his Britannic Majesty, did him the honour of writing under date of the 27th July, is directed to offer the following observations:

If the British Government tolerates censures upon the acts of its Administration, and the personal abuse of the most respectable men, it does not suffer even the slightest attempt against the public tranquility, the fundamental laws of the empire and the supreme authority which arises from them. Every nation is, moreover, at liberty to sacrifice any advantage whatever in its interior, in order to obtain another to which it attaches a higher value; but the Government which does not repress the licentiousness of the press when it may be injurious to the honour or the interests of foreign powers, would afford an opportunity for libellists to endanger the public tranquility, or at least the good understanding that forms the basis of it, and whenever such serious injuries are continued in a regular and systematic manner, doubts must arise as to its own dispositions.

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The particular laws and constitution of Great Britain are subordinate to the general principles of the law of nations, which supersede the laws of each individual State. If it be the right of England to allow the most extensive liberty to the press, it is a public right of polished nations, and the bounden duty of Governments to prevent, repress, and punish, every attack which might by those means be made against the rights, the interests, and the honour of foreign powers.

This general maxim of the law of nations has never been mistaken without paving the way for the greatest divisions, and has even furnished in England a plausible pretext to those who have written volumes to prove the necessity of the last war against France. Are these men now desirous of presenting to the Consular Government a weapon which they have wielded with so much address? and can they flatter themselves that the authority which has signed the peace has not power to maintain it!

By the first Article of the Treaty of Amiens, the two powers agree to afford no protection, either directly or indirectly, to those who should cause prejudice to any of them.

But the greatest of all injuries doubtless is, that which tends to debase a Foreign Government, or to excite within its territory civil and religious commotions; and the most decided of all protections, is that which places under the safeguard of the laws, men who seek not only to disturb the political tranquility of Europe, but even to dissolve the first bonds of society.

The undersigned Minister must moreover observe, that this is not a question respecting some paragraphs, which, through the inadvertence of an Editor, might have been accidentally inserted in a public print; but it is a question of a deep and continued system of defamation, directed not only against the Chief of the French Republic, but against all the constituted authorities of the Republic, against the whole nation, represented by these libellers in the most odious and degrading terms. It has ever been remarked that many of these prints contain an appeal to the French People, against the Government and fundamental Laws of their country.

If these observations apply to the English writers, who, for these three months past, have deluged the public with the most perfidious and unbecoming publications, they are still more applicable to a class of foreign calumniators, who appear to avail themselves of the asylum offered them in England only for the purpose of the better gratifying their hatred against France, and undermining the foundations of peace.

It is not merely by insulting and seditious writings evidently published with a view to circulation in France but by other incendiary papers distributed through the maritime departments, in order to excite the evil disposed or weak inhabitants to resist the execution of the *concordate*, that these implacable enemies of France continued to exercise hostilities, and to provoke the just indignation of the French Government and people. Not a doubt exists of these writings having been composed and circulated by *Georges*, and by the former bishops of France —

These men can no longer be considered but as rebels against both political and religious authority; and after their reiterated attempts to disturb the good understanding between the two Governments, their residence in England militates openly against the spirit and treaty of the letter of peace.

The meetings which have likewise taken place in the Island of Jersey, and the odious plots which are there framed, in spite of the representations which the Undersigned Minister has already taken care to make on this subject, also demand immediate measures to be taken by Government, the neighbour and friend of France.

Other persons (attached, by recollections never to be effaced, and by regrets too long fostered, to an order of things which no longer exists in France) find themselves daily implicated by the plots of those who pretend to serve them. A sense of their own reputation will without doubt lead them to avoid a focus of intrigues, with which they ought not to have the least connection.

Peace happily re-established, the mutual desire of the two Governments to render it solid and lasting, and the general interests of humanity, require that all these causes of dissatisfaction should be done away, and that His Majesty's Ministry should, by frank and energetic measures, manifest their disapprobation of all the attempts made to produce new divisions.

The undersigned has in consequence received special orders to solicit :

1st. That His Majesty's Government will adopt the most effectual measures to put a stop to the unbecoming and seditious publications with which the newspapers and other writings printed in England are filled.

2d. That the individuals mentioned in the undersigned Minister's letter of the 23d July last, shall be sent out of the Island of Jersey.

3d. That the former Bishops of Arras and St. Pol de Léon, and all those, who like them, under the pretext of religion, seek to raise disturbances in the Interior of France, shall likewise be sent away.

4th. That *Georges* and his adherents shall be transported to Canada, according to the intention which the undersigned has been directed to transmit to his Government at the request of Lord Hawkesbury.

5th. That, in order to deprive the evil disposed of every pretext for disturbing the good understanding between the two Governments, it shall be recommended to the Princes of the House of Bourbon at present in Great Britain, to repair to Warsaw, the residence of the head of their Family.

6th. That such of the French Emigrants as still think proper to wear the orders and decorations belonging to the ancient Government of France, shall be required to quit the territory of the British Empire.

These demands are founded upon the treaty of Amiens, and upon the verbal assurances that the undersigned Minister has had the satisfaction to receive in the course of the negotiations, with regard to a mutual agreement for maintaining tranquillity and good order in the two Countries. If any one in particular of these

these demands does not proceed so immediately from the treaty concluded, it would be easy to justify it by striking examples, and to prove how very attentive the British Government has been in times of internal fermentation, to remove from the territory of a neighbouring power those who might endanger the public tranquillity.

Whatever may be the protection which the English laws afford to native writers and to other subjects of his Majesty, the French Government knows that foreigners do not here enjoy the same protection: and that the law known by the title of the *Alien Act*, gives the Ministry of his Britannic Majesty an authority which it has often exercised against foreigners whose residence was prejudicial to the interest of Great Britain. The first clause of this act states expressly, that any order in council which requires a foreigner to quit the kingdom shall be executed under pain of imprisonment and transportation. There exists, therefore, in the Ministry a legal and sufficient power to restrain foreigners, without having recourse to the Courts of Law, and the French Government, which offers on this point a perfect reciprocity, thinks it gives a new proof of its pacific intentions, by demanding that those persons may be sent away, whose machinations uniformly tend to sow discord between the two people. It owes to itself and the nation at large, (which has made it the depository of its power and of its honour) not to appear insensible to insults and to plots during profound Peace, which the irritation of open War could not justify, and it is too well acquainted with the conciliatory dispositions of the British ministry, not to rely upon its efforts to disperse a faction equally the enemy of France and England.

The undersigned minister seizes this opportunity to present to his Excellency Lord Hawkesbury, the homage of his respectful consideration.

(Signed)

OTTO.

London, 17th August 1802.

No. 13.

Downing-street, August 28, 1802.

Sir—I send you the copy of a letter which I received some days ago from M. Otto, together with a copy of an official note, inclosed in it. I have informed M. Otto, that you would receive instructions to enter into explanations with the French Government on the several points to which it refers. It is impossible not to feel considerable surprize at the circumstances under which it has been thought proper to present such a note; at the stile in which it is drawn up, and at the complaints contained in it.—Whatever may be the general dispositions of the French Government towards this country, supposing them to be as hostile as they have been at any former period, or even more so, it would appear so contrary to their interest to provoke a war with us at the present moment, that I am inclined to ascribe their conduct, in the whole of this business more to temper, than to any other motive.—but whether their conduct is to be referred to temper or to policy, the effects of it may still be the same; it is therefore become of the utmost importance that a frank explanation

planation should be made of the line of conduct which his Majesty has determined to adopt on reasons of the nature of those to which this note refers, and of the motives on which it is founded; and it is to be hoped that such an explanation will have the effect of putting an end to a course of proceeding which can lead only to a perpetual irritation between the two Governments, and which might ultimately tend to the most serious consequences.

The first consideration that naturally arises on this transaction, is that of the peculiar circumstances under which the note of M. Otto has been presented. It cannot be denied that some very improper paragraphs have lately appeared in some of the English newspapers against the Government of France; it cannot be denied likewise, that publications of a still more improper and indecent nature have made their appearance in this country, with the names of foreigners affixed to them. Under these circumstances the French Government would have been warranted in expecting every redress that the laws of this country could afford them:—but as, instead of seeking it in the ordinary course, they have thought fit to resort to recrimination themselves, or at least to authorize it in others, they could have no right to complain if their subsequent appeal to his Majesty had failed to produce the effect that otherwise would have attended it.

Whatever may have been the nature of the prior injury, they have in fact taken the law into their own hands: And what is this recrimination and retort? The paragraphs in the English newspapers, the publications to which I have above referred, have not appeared under any authority of the British Government, and are disavowed and disapproved of by them; but the paragraph in the *Moniteur* has appeared in a paper avowedly official, for which the Government are therefore considered as responsible, as his Majesty's Government is responsible for the contents of the *London Gazette*. And this retort is not confined to the unauthorized English newspapers, or to the other publications of which complaint is now made, but is converted into, and made a pretence for a direct attack upon the Government of his Majesty. His Majesty feels it beneath his dignity to make any formal complaint on this occasion; but it has been impossible for me to proceed to the other parts of the subject, without pointing your attention to the conduct of the French Government in this respect, that you may observe upon it in the manner it deserves.

The propositions in M. Otto's official Note, are six in number; but may in fact be divided under two heads: the First, that which relates to the libels of all descriptions, which are alledged to be published against the French government: the last, comprehending the five complaints which relate to the emigrants resident in this country. On the first, I am sure you must be aware that his Majesty cannot, and never will, in consequence of any representation or any menace from a foreign Power, make any concession,

concession, which can be in the smallest degree dangerous to the liberty of the press, as secured by the Constitution of this country. This liberty is justly dear to every British Subject. The Constitution admits of no previous restraints upon publications of any description. but there exist *judicatures* wholly independent of the Executive government, capable of taking cognizance of such publications as the law deems to be criminal, and which are bound to inflict the punishment the delinquents may deserve; these judicatures may take cognizance not only of libels against the Government and the Magistracy of this kingdom, but, as has been repeatedly experienced, of publications defamatory of those in whose hands the administration of foreign governments is placed. That our government neither has nor wants any other protection than what the laws of the country afford; and tho' they are willing and ready to give to every foreign government all the protection against offences of this nature which the principle of their Laws and Constitution will admit, they never can consent to new model their Laws, or to change their Constitution, to gratify the wishes of any foreign Power. If the present French Government are dissatisfied with our laws on the subject of libels or entertain the opinion that the administration of justice in our Courts is too tardy and lenient, they have it in their power to redress themselves by punishing the venders and distributors of such publications within their own territories, in any manner that they may think proper, and thereby preventing the circulation of them. If they think their present laws are not sufficient for this purpose they may enact new ones; or, if they think it expedient, they may exercise the right which they have of prohibiting the importation of any foreign newspapers, or periodical publications, into the territories of the French Republic. His Majesty will not complain of such a measure, as it is not his intention to interfere in the manner in which the people or territories of France should be governed; but he expects on the other hand, that the French Government will not interfere in the manner in which the government of his dominions is conducted, or call for a change in those laws with which his people are perfectly satisfied. With respect to the distinction which appears to be drawn in *M. Otto's* Note, between the publications of British subjects and those of foreigners, and the power which his Majesty is supposed to have in consequence of the Alien Act, of sending Foreigners out of his dominions; it is important to observe that the provisions of that Act were made for the purpose of preventing the residence of foreigners, whose numbers and principles had a tendency to disturb the internal peace of his own dominions, and to whom the safety of those dominions might require in many instances to be removed, even if their actual conduct had not exposed them to punishment by law. It does not follow that it would be a warrantable application of such a law to exert its powers

powers in the cases of individuals such as those of whom complaint is now made, and particularly as they are liable to be prosecuted under the law of the land, in like manner as others have been in similar cases, at the instance, and upon the complaint of foreign Governments.

The second general head, which includes the five last complaints, relates to the removal of some of the French Emigrants resident in this country.—His Majesty entertained hopes that the explanation furnished on this head in my Dispatch No. 14. would have proved satisfactory, and would have precluded the necessity of any further discussion on this subject. The French Government have, upon several occasions, resorted on this part of the subject to precedent, and have particularly rested on the demand formerly made by this country, that the person then called the Pretender, should be sent from the French dominions. It is important, that the differences between these two cases should be stated. When James the Second abdicated the throne, and left this country, he retired with his adherents to France; and though in the war which immediately succeeded that event, the French Government adopted his cause as their own, no stipulation was made at the Treaty of Ryswick that he should be sent from the country, nor was any subsequent demand ever made to the French Government to this effect; but he was suffered to remain at St. Germain, in the neighbourhood of Paris, surrounded by his family and friends, till the time of his death. It was not till after his demise, when Louis the Fourteenth, in direct violation of the Treaty of Ryswick, had acknowledged his son as King of Great-Britain, that a different course of proceeding was adopted by the British Government, and in the Treaty of Peace signed at Utrecht, which put an end to the war which had been carried on, on account of the Spanish succession, an article was inserted to prevent the Pretender from residing in any part of the French dominions. The demand which was subsequently made for the removal of the Pretender from a town which was situated in the centre of these dominions, was founded on this article of the Treaty, which was in fact one of the conditions of the Peace: but both the article in the Treaty and the demand were confined to the Pretender personally, and were not extended to any of his family, or to any of his adherents. After his removal, many of his adherents continued to reside in France; many persons resident in this country, who were attached to the cause of the Pretender, and had promoted the rebellion in his favour, and who were consequently attainted for High Treason, sought refuge in France, and were permitted to remain there till their death, without any application ever having been made by the British Government for their removal. The Duke of Berwick, the natural son of James the Second, who from his principle and talents was the most dangerous man to the interests of this
Country

Country and the Protestant succession, continued to be a General in the French Armies, and though descended from the King, an Englishman and an Emigrant, it was not required that he should be sent out of France. In the present case, there is no article in the treaty of Peace, by which his Majesty is bound to send from this Country any Frenchman whatever, except on account of the crimes specified in the 20th article of the Definitive Treaty, and in consequence of the proofs therein required having been adduced. In the present case, it cannot be pretended that his majesty has ever given the slightest countenance to the cause of the Royalists in France against the present Government; since the period when he acknowledged that Government; and if there were not these important differences in the two cases, they would be totally dissimilar in the only remaining point; for in the case of the House of Stuart, as has been already stated, notwithstanding the violence of the times, and the danger to which the Protestant succession was really exposed, this strong act of authority was confined to the person of the Pretender; and the individual who must be recognized in that character by the French Government, and whose case can alone bear any similarity to the former even in this respect, is not, and never has been within his majesty's dominions. Other precedents might be adduced on this subject; but it is not necessary to state them, as the foregoing are sufficient.

With respect to the complaints in detail under the second head.—Upon the first, you may inform the French Government, that the Emigrants in Jersey, many of whom had remained there solely on account of the cheapness of subsistence, had actually removed, or were removing previous to the representation concerning them in Mr. Otto's Note, and that before your explanation with M. Talleyrand can take place, there will probably not be an Emigrant in the Island.

To the second complaint which relates to the Bishops of Arras and Saint Paul de Leon, and others, his majesty can only reply, that if the facts alledged against them can be substantiated; if it can be proved that they have distributed papers on the coast of France, with a view of disturbing the government, and of inducing the people to resist the new church establishment, his majesty would think himself justified in taking all measures within his power for obliging them to leave the country; but some proof must be adduced of those facts; and such proof must not be that of their having in a single instance, viz. in reply to the Pope's mandate, published a vindication of their own conduct, in refusing to conform to the new establishment, a proceeding in which they would be justifiable on every principle of toleration and justice; but it should shew that they have since availed themselves of their situation in this country to excite the people of France against the authority of that government, whether civil or ecclesiastical.

On the third complaint, which respects the removal of *Georges* and those persons supposed to be described as his adherents, Mr. Otto must have mistaken me in what he supposes me to have said on that subject. His Majesty is however very desirous to obviate any cause of complaint or uneasiness with respect to these persons; and measures are in contemplation, and will be taken, for the purpose of removing them out of his Majesty's European dominions.

On the fourth complaint respecting the Princes of the House of Bourbon, I can only refer you to my former answer. His Majesty has no desire that they should continue to reside in this country, if they are disposed, or can be induced to quit it; but he feels it to be inconsistent with his honour and his sense of justice to withdraw from them the rights of hospitality, as long as they conduct themselves peaceably and quietly; and unless some charge can be substantiated of their attempting to disturb the peace which subsists between the two governments.

With respect to the fifth complaint, which relates to the French emigrants wearing in this country the orders of their ancient government; there are few, if any, persons of that description in this country who wear such orders. It might be more proper if they all abstained from it; but the French government could not persist in expecting, that even if it were consistent with law, his Majesty would be induced to commit so harsh an act of authority as to send them out of the country on such an account.

I have thus stated to you his Majesty's sentiments on the several points contained in Mr. Otto's Note. You will take an early opportunity of communicating these sentiments to the French Government, and of accompanying them with the arguments and explanations above stated. And if it should be desired, and you should be of opinion, that it was likely to produce any good effect, there is no objection to your putting the substance of what you shall have stated in writing, and of delivering it to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as a memorandum of your conversation.

Upon the general tone and style of Mr. Otto's Note, it is important to observe, that it is far from conciliating; and that the practice of presenting notes of this description, on any motive or suggestion of personal irritation, cannot fail to have the effect of indisposing the two Governments towards each other, instead of consolidating and strengthening the peace which happily subsists between them. That after a war, in which the passions of men have been roused beyond all former examples, it is natural to suppose that the distrust, jealousy, and other hostile feelings of individuals should not immediately subside, and under these circumstances it appears to be both the interest and the duty of the two Governments by a mild and temperate conduct gradually to allay these feelings and not on the contrary to provoke and augment them by untimely irritation on their part, and by ascribing proceedings like those above noticed, to causes to which they have no reference. His Majesty has thus fully and
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Frankly explained his sentiments, and the ground of his conduct. He is sincerely disposed to adopt every measure for the preservation of peace, which is consistent with the honour and independence of the country, and with the security of its laws and constitution. But the French Government must have formed a most erroneous judgment of the disposition of the British nation, and of the character of its Government, if they have been taught to expect that any representation of a foreign power will ever induce them to consent to a violation of those rights on which the liberties of the people of this country are founded. I have the honour to be &c.

(Signed)

“ HAWKESBURY.

Anthony Merry, Esq.

No. 14.

Translation.—NTOE.

General Vial, minister Plenipotentiary of the republic of Malta, having set out for his destination about the 20th of July, it is to be presumed, that he will soon be in a condition to enter into a concert with his Britannic majesty's minister Plenipotentiary on the evacuation of Malta, and of its dependencies.

The three months, in which this evacuation should have taken place, are expired; and it being the intention of the two Governments that the execution of the treaty of Amiens should experience the least possible delay, the First Consul would have been desirous that the two thousand Neapolitans who are ready to depart could have been transported at an early period to the island of Malta, to be in readiness whenever the evacuation shall be on the point of being effected.

It appears, nevertheless, that Mr. Drummond, the English minister at Naples, has not been authorized by his Government to facilitate this transport: and that the motive alleged by that minister was, that the stipulations which ought to precede the evacuation not being fulfilled, that evacuation could not yet take place.

In communicating the above details to his Excellency Lord Hawkesbury, his Britannic majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the foreign department, the undersigned is directed to observe, that the sending the two thousand Neapolitan troops to the island of Malta cannot but be considered as a preliminary step, in order to accelerate the evacuation, as soon as the necessary measures shall have been taken by the respective Plenipotentiaries; and that it does not in any manner prevent the subsequent concert on the details of the evacuation, conformably to the clauses of the treaty of Amiens.

The undersigned is moreover directed to request the British ministry to give general instructions to his majesty's Plenipotentiaries at Naples, and at Malta, that the evacuation and the other conditions of the 10th article may be executed without obstacle, and without these Plenipotentiaries conceiving themselves obliged to their government on each of the successive operations which should take place.

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The undersigned embraces this opportunity to present to his Excellency Lord Hawkesbury, the homage of his respectful consideration.

London August 21st. 1802.

(Signed)

OTTO.

His Excellency Lord Hawkesbury, &c. &c."

No 15.—NOTE.

The undersigned has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Otto's note of the 21st. instant

When the Neapolitan government notified to Mr. Drummond, the King's minister at Naples, that the 2000 troops which his Sicilian majesty had selected to serve in Malta, were ready to proceed to their destination, that gentleman declined taking any step to facilitate their embarkation, till he should receive intelligence of the arrival of Sir Alexander Ball in that island, and till he should be informed that the Commander in Chief of the British forces had made suitable preparations for their reception. By the last advices from Malta it appears, that Sir Alexander Ball had arrived there on the tenth of last month, and that after having conferred with general Fox upon the subject, he had written to Mr. Drummond, that there was no impediment whatever to the immediate reception of the Neapolitan troops, and that their quarters would be prepared accordingly; the undersigned has the honour to state this to M. Otto as the most satisfactory answer which he can give to his note. It is probable, therefore, that the troops of his Sicilian majesty are already embarked on their passage; but to prevent the possibility of any unnecessary delay or misconception, the most explicit instructions will be immediately forwarded to Mr. Drummond on this subject.

With respect to the points in M. Otto's note, the undersigned can only repeat what he has before stated to him, that his majesty is most sincerely desirous to see all the stipulations of the tenth article of the definitive treaty carried into effect with the utmost punctuality, and with the least possible delay. With this view he takes this opportunity of observing to M. Otto, that by the last dispatches from the English ambassador at St. Petersburg, the French minister at that court had not even then received instructions from his government relative to the steps to be taken in concert with Lord St. Helens, for inviting the Emperor to become a guaranty for the provisions and stipulations of the article in question. The French minister at Berlin was in the same predicament. The undersigned, therefore, requests that M. Otto would have the goodness to represent these circumstances to his government, and to urge them, if they have not already done it, to transmit without delay to their ministers at those courts the necessary instructions for bringing this part of the business to a conclusion.

The undersigned requests M. Otto to accept the assurances of his highest consideration.

(Signed)

HAWKESBURY.

Downing-street, August 23d, 1803.

No. 16.—Extract of a dispatch from Mr. Merry to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, October 3, 1802.

As soon as the Helvetic Government had retired from Berne to Lausanne, the partizans of the antient federative system of the Swiss cantons, who established immediately in the former city a provisional government, deputed a confidential to Paris, for the purpose of counteracting the measures of M. Stapfer, and of engaging the First Consul to suffer the inhabitants of Switzerland to settle their affairs amongst themselves. He was instructed in any emergency to address himself to the ministers here of the principal powers of Europe, and to solicit their interference and assistance in the objects of his mission. He reached Paris four days ago, and had reason to flatter himself, from the result of an interview which he had immediately with M. Talleyrand, that the First Consul would put no obstacle in the way of any arrangement which the Swiss might agree upon among themselves for the final settlement of their government: he was therefore much surprised to learn soon afterwards, that a change had taken place in the First Consul's sentiments, and his astonishment was completed when he found that the latter had taken so decided and so unfavourable a part of the business, as that which is announced by a resolution published in yesterday's *Moniteur*, (which I have the honour to transmit inclosed) in the form of address to the inhabitants of Switzerland. This person having, besides this public declaration, acquired some private information of its being the First Consul's intention to give the most immediate and vigorous effect to it, lost no time in addressing a letter to the latter, in which he took the liberty of stating that he must have been deceived by false representations, that his interference in the affairs of Switzerland, was, as he was authorized to say, entirely unsolicited by the majority, and the best thinking part of the inhabitants: and that he had, therefore, to entreat of him, in the most earnest manner, to suspend the execution of his resolution until those explanations could take place which he trusted might be the means of preventing the immense effusion of blood which would otherwise inevitably ensue. He at the same time addressed himself in the course of yesterday to me, as well as to the Austrian and Spanish ambassadors, and to the Russian and Prussian ministers, (not having gained admittance to *Monsi. de Cobenzel*, nor to *M. de Markoff* or *Lucchesini*: he afterwards wrote to them) soliciting, in the strongest terms, an interference (jointly, if possible) on their part, with the French government, to endeavour to avert the impending evil. I naturally observed to him in answer, that the present state of political relations between the great powers of Europe afforded no prospect of his obtaining of their ministers at Paris, to adopt a concerted measure in favour of the object which he had so much at heart, and that of course I could not take it individually upon myself, without an express instruction from my government. He returned to me to-day, to acquaint me that he was not only as yet without a reply from any quarter, but had reason to fear that his prayers would

would not be listened to by the Austrian, Russian, and Prussian Ministers; he therefore conjured me to transmit them to His Majesty's Government, from whom only his countrymen could have a hope of deriving any assistance in the terrible conflict which he knew they were determined to stand, and which would only cease by the extermination of every virtuous and brave man in the country. He then put into my hand a note which he had drawn up in a hurry, and of which I enclose a copy. Whilst, my Lord, it was out of my power to give him any encouragement to expect from His Majesty's Government the assistance which his petition expresses, I have thought it my duty to lose no time in making you acquainted with a state of things which may shortly be attended with very important consequences.

(Inclosure referred to in No. 16.)—Translation.—NOTE.

“ So long as Switzerland was occupied by the French armies, the wishes of the people could never be freely manifested. The petty revolutions which took place in the government were the mere tricks of certain factions in which the nation at large took but a very trifling interest. Scarcely did Switzerland think herself independant when she was desirous of returning to her ancient institutions, rendered still dearer to her by her late misfortunes, and the arbitrary acts of the government furnished her with the means of doing so. Almost the whole of Switzerland, with unexampled unanimity and moderation, shook off the yoke. The Cantons formed themselves into Constituent Bodies; and twelve of the thirteen Cantons of Switzerland sent their Representatives to the Diet of Schwitz, in order there to organize a central power which might be acceptable to the neighbouring powers.

“ The Aristocratical cantons renounced their exclusive rights; the Pays de Vaud was left at liberty to form its own Constitution, as well as Thurgovia and the other new cantons.

“ The Government having taken refuge at Lausanne, was by no means secure there, notwithstanding its regular troops; perhaps even at the present moment it no longer exists.

“ Who would not have thought that according to the stipulation of the treaty of Luneville, which grants independence to Switzerland, and the right of choosing its own Government, every thing was settled, and that this nation might see its former happiness and tranquillity revive?

“ Who could have thought that the First Consul would have issued such a decree as that of the 8th Vendemaire ()?

“ Is an independent Nation to be thus treated? Should Bonaparte persist in his determination, and the other Powers should not interpose in our favour, it only remains for us either to bury ourselves in the ruins of our houses, although without hope of resistance, exhausted as we are by the Colossus who is about to overwhelm us, or to debase ourselves in the eyes of the whole Universe!”

“ Will the Government of this generous Nation, which has at all times afforded so many proofs of the interest it takes in the welfare of the Swiss, do nothing for us under circumstances which are to decide, whether we are still to be ranked amongst *free People*?

“ We have only men left us.—The revolution, and spoliations without end, have exhausted our means. We are without arms, without ammunition, without stores, and without money to purchase them.”

No. 17—NOTE VERBALE.

Lord Hawkesbury has received his majesty's commands to communicate, through M. Otto, to the French Government, the sentiments of deep regret which have been excited in his majesty's mind by the address of the First Consul to the Helvetic people, which was published by authority in the *Moniteur* of the 11th instant, and by the representations which have been made to his majesty on this subject, on behalf of the nation whose interests are so immediately affected by it. His majesty most sincerely laments the convulsions to which the Swiss cantons have for some time past been exposed; but he can consider their late exertions in no other light than as the lawful efforts of a brave and generous people to recover their antient laws and government, and to procure the re establishment of a system which experience has demonstrated, not only to be favourable to the maintenance of their domestic happiness, but to be perfectly consistent with the tranquillity and security of other powers.

The cantons of Switzerland unquestionably, possess in the same degree as every other independent state, the right of regulating their own internal concerns; and this right has moreover, in the present instance, been formally and explicitly guaranteed to the Swiss nation by the French Government in the treaty of Luneville conjointly with the other powers who were parties in that engagement. His majesty has no other desire than that the people of Switzerland, who now appear to be so generally united, should be left at liberty to settle their own internal government without the interposition of any foreign powers; and that with whatever regret his majesty may have perused the late proclamation of the French Government, he is yet unwilling to believe that they will farther attempt to controul that independent nation in the exercise of their undoubted rights. His majesty thinks himself called upon by his regard for the general interests of Europe, and by his particular solicitude for the happiness and welfare of the Swiss nation, to express these his sentiments with a frankness and sincerity which he feels to be due to his character, and to the good understanding which he is desirous of preserving with the Government of France.

Downing-strect, October 10, 1802.

M. Otto, &c. &c. &c.

No. 18. Downing-street, October 10, 1802.

Sir—His majesty having deemed it expedient, that a confidential person should be sent at the present moment to Switzerland, in consequence of the communication which he has received from the Swiss Confederacy, through their Representative at Paris, I am commanded to inform you that he has made choice of you for that purpose.

It is of the utmost consequence, considering the nature of the business with which you are entrusted; that you should make every practicable exertion to arrive on the frontiers of Switzerland with as little delay as possible. You will inform yourself there what is the actual residence of the Government of the Swiss Confederation, to which you will immediately repair. Having taken the proper means to obtain a confidential interview with the persons who may be entrusted with the principal direction of affairs, you will communicate to them a copy of the note verbale which I delivered to M. Otto, and which is herewith inclosed; and you will take every opportunity of impressing upon their minds the deep interest which his majesty takes in the success of their exertions. You will state to them, that his majesty entertains hopes, that his representation to the French Government may have the effect of inducing the First Consul to abandon his intention of compelling the Swiss Nation by force to renounce that system of Government under which they had so long prospered, and to which they appear to be almost unanimously anxious to return.—In this event his majesty will feel himself bound to abstain from all interference on his part; it being his earnest desire that the Swiss Nation should be left at liberty to regulate their own internal concerns, without the interposition of any foreign power. If, however, contrary to his majesty's expectations, the French Government should persist in the system of coercion, announced in the Proclamation of the First Consul, inserted in the *Moniteur* of the 1st inst. you will, in that case, inform yourself, by every means in your power, of the disposition of the people at large of the Swiss Confederacy, and particularly of those who have the direction of their affairs, and of those who possess the greatest share of influence amongst them, to persevere in the defence of their rights, and in the maintenance of the system they have adopted. You will likewise enquire into the means of defence of which they may be possessed, and of the probability of their being exerted with success. You will on no account encourage them to persevere in active measures of resistance, which they are not themselves desirous to adopt, or which they may believe are unlikely to be ultimately effectual. If, however, you should find that the people of the Swiss Confederacy are generally determined to persevere in the maintenance of their independence, and of their Right to return to their ancient System of Govt; and if you should be of opinion
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the union that subsists amongst the people, and from their zeal and enthusiasm in the cause in which they are engaged, they are finally resolved at all hazards to resist the threatened attempt of the French Government to interpose by force of arms, in the settlement of their internal concerns; you will then immediately communicate, in confidence, to the Swiss Government, that either in the event of a French army having entered the country, or in the event of your having reason to be convinced that a French army is actually advancing for that purpose, his Majesty has authorized you to accede to their application for pecuniary succour.

I have furnished you with a cypher and decypher that you may have it in your power to correspond with his Majesty's Ministers at Vienna and Munich, if you should think it advisable; and it is highly probable that the armies of the Swiss Confederacy may be inadequately supplied with arms, ammunition, or provisions, and may be desirous of procuring supplies thereof from the neighbouring countries, you will use your utmost endeavours to give them every facility for this purpose. You will be very particular in informing me of the numbers and situation of any Austrian corps in the neighbourhood of Switzerland, and of the probability of their advancing in any event into the Swiss territory.

As it is of great importance that his Majesty's Government should be regularly informed of the events which may be passing in Switzerland, and of the dispositions that may prevail there, you will endeavour to ascertain the most safe and expeditious mode of conveying your letters which will avoid their passing through any part of the French republic.

As it is possible that previous to your arrival in Switzerland the present state of affairs may have undergone a decided alteration, either in consequence of the submission of the Swiss Cantons, or of any compromise having taken place as to their internal concerns, it will be proper that, in that case, you should take up your residence in such a situation as you may think most convenient in the neighbourhood of Switzerland, of which you will give me the earliest intelligence, and there wait for his Majesty's further orders. I am, with great truth and regard, Sir, your most obedient humble servant,

(Signed)

HAWKESBURY.

Francis Moore, Esq.

No. 19, dated Constance, October 31, announces the submission of the Swiss Diet, and that Mr. Moore, in consequence, waited in the neighbourhood of Switzerland for fresh instructions.

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(No.

(No. 20.)

Downing-street, Nov. 25, 1802.

Sir—I have duly received your several letters by the Messenger Shaw.

As from the present state of Switzerland your continuance in the vicinity of that country appears to be no longer necessary, you are at liberty to return to England as soon as it may suit your convenience.

I am, &c.
Francis Moore, Esq.

(Signed)

HAWKESBURY.

No. 21. Extract of a dispatch from Mr. Lison to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Hague, 13th October, 1802.

A few hours after I had sent off my last dispatch to your Lordship (on Saturday the 9th of this month), the French Ambassador, M. de Semonville, waited upon the President of the Government of State, and informed him that he had just received, by a courier from Paris, orders to inform the Government of this country,

* *Que le Premier Consul avoit appris, avec autant de surprise que d'indignation, que des personnes avides de revolutions vouloient de nouveau troubler le repos dans le Batavie, en abusant même pour cet effet de noms respectables; et que la Premier Consul, comme allié de la Republique, invitoit le Gouvernement à prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour maintenir l'Ordre des choses établi par la Constitution.*

These were nearly the words read to me by the Secretary of State, from a note in his own hand-writing, dictated to him by M. de Semonville, with a view to its publication, (and a translation was accordingly inserted in the Dutch official Paper of the Hague on the 11th); but they fall very short of the language employed by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs in his dispatches to the Ambassador, and in the communication made by him to the Dutch Charge d'Affairs at Paris, (who also sent a Messenger to the Hague upon this occasion.) In these M. de Talleyrand entered into considerable detail on the subject of the plots supposed to be formed in this country against the Administration, mentioned the names of the Chiefs, and ended by making an offer, on the part of the First Consul, to come to the assistance of the Government (should circumstances render it necessary) with all his forces.

No. 22.

Hague, October 29, 1802.

My Lord—The recent attack made by Bonaparte upon the liberties and independence of the Swiss Cantons, has naturally made a strong impression on the inhabitants of this country; and the public anxiety has been much augmented by certain symptoms in the conduct of the Consular Government, which seem to indicate an intention to withdraw the French troops, which have been kept in the Batavian republic for some time past, under the title of *Auxiliaries*, and paid and maintained at the expence of the Dutch nation.

These troops (amounting to between ten and eleven thousand men) were to remain here till the conclusion of the definitive treaty with Great Britain. It was afterwards formally promised on

* That the First Consul had learned with equal surprize and indignation, that certain persons ardent for revolution had again attempted to disturb the tranquillity of Batavia, and for that purpose had traduced the most respected names, and, that the First Consul as an Ally of that Republic, invited the Government to take all necessary steps to preserve the esta-

on the part of France, that they should evacuate the territories of the Republic at the latest, on the expiration of the last French year (the 23d of September.) They accordingly began their march to the southward a few days before that period; and the people rejoiced at the prospect of being finally relieved from a load which has been extremely irksome to them. But, on pretence that a great proportion of the corps were to be embarked at Flushing for Louisiana, and that there was a want of shipping for their accommodation, they took up their quarters on the frontiers of the country (at Bois le Duc, Breda, and Bergen-op-Zoom), where they still remain; and demands have continued to be made for their pay and maintenance.

Hopes were, however, entertained from day to day, that their departure would take place; when, to the astonishment of the Batavian Government, official notice was (last week) transmitted from France to the department of war at the Hague, (which has been charged with the support of these corps), that the First Consul has been pleased to appoint a new Commander in Chief, (General Montrichard), and a new staff, for the auxiliary troops in this country; and the notice was given that Government might provide for the pay of the officers in question.

The Administration appear resolved to oppose all the resistance in their power to this unexpected and oppressive extortion. An express has been sent off to the Dutch Ambassador at Paris, charging him to claim, in the most urgent terms, the accomplishment of the treaties subsisting between the two Republics, and the fulfilment of the repeated and recent promises made by the French Government upon this subject. And in case of the failure of this application, they talk of addressing themselves to the principal Powers of Europe who had any share or influence in the conclusion of the Peace, to intreat their intervention and good offices, with a view to the maintenance of the independence of the Republic.—I have the honour to be, &c.

ROBERT LISTON.

Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c. &c. &c.

No. 23. Extract of a Dispatch from Lord Hawkesbury, to Lord Whitworth, dated November 30, 1802.

His Majesty's Government have learnt with some surprize from the communications from General Stuart, that that officer had signified to Colonel Sebastiani his inability to evacuate Egypt, untill he should receive specific orders for that purpose. It is certainly true that no warrant has been transmitted to General Stuart, or to his predecessor the Earl of Cavan, for the evacuation of Egypt: neither was it considered to be necessary, in as much as his Majesty's Government had already expressed their intention to General Stuart, in his instructions, that, except in a case of absolute necessity, the King's troops should remain in Egypt no longer than the month of July last. In all the in-

stances of places which had been conquered by the King's forces and of which possession had been taken in his Majesty's name, it has been usual when they have been restored to the French Republic or its Allies, that the commanding officer should be furnished with a regular warrant under the King's sign manual, authorising him to make such restoration. But the case in Egypt is different, as that country had never been taken possession of in his Majesty's name, as it had been actually restored to the Ottoman Porte, and as certain stations in it were continued to be occupied merely as military posts, until the means of removing the troops should be provided.

It is probable, that in the present instance, General Stuart may have been misled by a doubt as to the extent of his own power, and by the opinion that he required a warrant to evacuate Egypt, similar to that which had been granted to officers who superintended the restitution of conquests of which possession had been taken in his Majesty's name. In order, however, to obviate any farther difficulties, instructions have now been sent to General Stuart, directing him to remove the King's troops from Egypt with as little delay as possible, and information has been given to this effect to General Andreossi.

No. 24. Extract of a Dispatch from Lord St. Helens to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Petersburg, July 20, 1802.

I have since renewed my application to this Government on the business of Malta, and have some reasons to hope that some impression has been made on the mind of his Imperial Majesty. The French Minister however has not yet received his instructions: and till they arrive, it will of course be impossible for me to take the requisite steps for bringing this affair to any satisfactory, or even positive issue.

No. 25.—Is an extract of a dispatch from Lord St. Helens to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Petersburg, August 4, 1802, announcing, that he had not been able to make an official demand of the Emperor's guaranty, according to the terms of the treaty of Amiens, as the French Minister was still without instructions authorizing him to join in the demand.

No. 26.—Extract of a dispatch from the Honourable A. Paget to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Vienna, 18th July, 1802.

On the 15th instant, M. de Champagny and I met at the conference at the Vice Chancellor's, to whom we presented our respective Notes, copies of which I have the honour to enclose, marked A. and B.

(The inclosure marked A.)

Merely invites the Vice Chancellor to lay the 13th paragraph of the article in the treaty, respecting the guarantee of Malta, before his Imperial Majesty.

The inclosure, marked B.

Is a Note to the same purpose from Champagny, the French Minister.

No. 27.—Extract of a Dispatch from the Hon. A. Paget to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Vienna, 22d August, 1802.

I have the honour herewith to transmit to your Lordship the Emperor's act of guarantee and accession to the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens.

(The Inclosure referred to in the above.)

The act of guarantee and accession of the Emperor of Germany is in the usual form, and is signed by

FRANCIS Count of Colloredo.

LEWIS Count of Cobenzel.

No. 28.—Extract of a Dispatch from Mr. Casamajor to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Berlin, August 21, 1802.

Having opened the subject of your Lordship's last dispatch, relative to the accession of this Court to the arrangement stipulated in the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens, to Mr. Bignon, this gentleman undertook very willingly to mention the same to his Government, and has in fact already performed his promise. In several conversations with Mr. Bignon, in which I have occasionally remarked that nothing had hitherto been said to me here upon the subject of Malta, he has constantly affected the greatest indifference, and treated it as a business of too little importance to occupy the attention of the French Government.

No. 29.—Extract of a Dispatch from Mr. Casamajor to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Berlin, August 31, 1802.

Mr. Bignon received last night instructions from the French Government, to invite the King of Prussia, conjointly with me, to accede to the guarantee of the independence of the Island of Malta, and of the other stipulations relating to that island, which are contained in the tenth article of the definitive treaty of Amiens. Mr. Bignon sent to me immediately, and we propose to meet to-morrow for the purpose of preparing a Note upon this subject, of which we shall each present a copy to Count Haugwitz.

No. 30.—Extract of a Dispatch from Mr. Casamajor to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Berlin, October 2, 1802.

My Note upon the subject of the guarantee of Malta remains unanswered.

No. 31.—Extract of a Dispatch from Mr. Jackson to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Berlin, November 25, 1802.

At my first interview with Count Haugwitz, I told him that the only subject in suspense between our two courts, to which I need call his immediate attention, was that of the guaranty of Malta, on which an answer is still due from him. He adverted to what he had told Mr. Casamajor of the King his master having ordered a report to be made to him on the state of the commanderies in Silesia, hinting that this country took a very slight interest in the fate of the island; and that he was countenanced in withholding its guaranty *by the example of Spain*. He however added that the report in question had been made to the
King,

King, and that he only waited his majesty's commands to confer with me farther upon the subject.

No. 32.—Extract of a Dispatch from Mr. Garlike to Lord Hawkesbury
Dated Petersburg, Sept. 17, 1802.

The French minister has, at length, been directed by his Government to make, conjointly with his majesty's minister here a formal invitation to the Emperor of Russia for his Imperial majesty's guaranty of the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens.

No. 33. Extract of a Dispatch from Sir John Borlase Warren to Lord Hawkesbury, dated St. Petersburg, Nov. 18, 1802.

On the 3d instant I waited upon the Chancellor with General Hedouville, when the Note of invitation for his Imperial majesty's guaranty of the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens, was presented by each of us.

No. 34. Extract of a Dispatch from Sir J. B. Warren to Lord Hawkesbury dated St. Petersburg, 25th Nov. 1802.

The Chancellor appointed yesterday evening for delivering to me, and to the French minister, the answer of the Russian Government to his majesty's invitation for his Imperial majesty's accession to the tenth article of the treaty of Amiens.

(Inclosure referred to in No. 34.)—Translation.

Conditions upon which His Imperial Majesty of all the Russias is willing to accede to the stipulations of the 10th article of the Treaty of Amiens.

I. The acknowledgement of the Sovereignty of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem over the Island of Malta, and its dependencies; the acknowledgement of the grand master, and of the civil government of the Order, according to the ancient institutions, with the admission into it of native Maltese. Upon this point, as well as upon every other that may relate to its interior organization, the legal Government of the Order shall have the power to enact and prescribe such regulations as it may judge best calculated to promote the future welfare and prosperity of the Order.

II. The rights of the King of the two Sicilies, as Suzerain of the Island, shall remain on the same footing as they were previous to the war which is now terminated by the Treaty of Amiens.

III. The independance and neutrality of the island of Malta, its ports and dependencies, shall be secured and guaranteed by the respective contracting powers, who shall mutually engage to acknowledge and maintain that neutrality in all cases of war; whether between each other, or between any of them and any other power, not excepting His Sicilian Majesty, whose rights of sovereignty shall not extend so as to enable him to cause a departure from the neutrality of the Island, as guaranteed by the present Act.

IV. Until the order shall be in a situation to provide, by its own resources, for the maintenance of its independence and neutrality, as secured by the preceding articles, as well as for the defence

defence of their principal residence, the different forts shall be occupied by his Sicilian majesty's troops, who shall send a sufficient force for the defence of the island and its dependencies, the number of which shall be agreed upon by his said majesty and the two Contracting Powers, who shall take upon themselves conjointly, the expence of maintaining the whole of the said troops, so long as the defence of the island shall continue to be entrusted to them, during which period the said troops shall be under the authority of the grand master and his government.

V. The present additional Act shall be considered as forming an integral part of the Treaty of Amiens, the same as if it had been inserted therein, word for word, and shall be executed in like manner.

VI. Their majesties the Emperor of all the Russias, the Empr. of the Romans, the King of Spain, the King of the Two Sicilies, and the King of Prussia, shall be invited to accede to this act as guarantees.

(Signed)

COMTE ALEXANDER DE WORONZOW.

No. 35.

Paris, January 27, 1803.

My Lord-- I have to report to your Lordship the purport of a conversation I had on Tuesday by appointment with M. Talleyrand. He had invited me some days ago for this purpose. The communication he had to make to me related to two points, both equally important, as he said, to the maintenance of good harmony between the two Countries; with this difference, however, that the one originated with himself, and was dictated by his anxiety to do away every thing which might feed the mutual irritation of the two countries: and the other by the express Order of the First Consul. That which came from himself related to the English Newspapers, against which he pronounced a most bitter philippic, assuring me that the First Consul was extremely hurt to find that his endeavours to conciliate had hitherto produced no effect than to encrease the abuse with which the Papers in England continually loaded him. He expatiated much upon this topic, and endeavoured to establish a fact, which I assured him a reference to any one Newspaper in Paris would instantly refute, that during four months not a word of provocation had appeared in any French Journal, which could justify a retort from those published in England. For the rest he advanced nothing but what has been said on more than one occasion to Mr. Merry, and reported by him to your Lordship. I was however given to understand, that the First Consul was in fact highly incensed, and the more so, he was pleased to say, as it came from a Country of whose good opinion he was so very ambitious.

In my reply, I could but go over the old ground, and endeavour to make M. Talleyrand understand--first, That whatever was said in the English Papers might be considered but as a national retaliation for what was published in the French Papers. Secondly, That what was *officially* published here was by no means so in England--and thirdly, That although the Govern-
ment

ment possessed a controul over the press in France, the English Government neither had nor could have, unless they purchased it at the same price, any whatever in England. Upon this he endeavoured to prove to me, that there were papers in England attached to different parties, and went over their names and supposed connections with great precipitation; and that consequently his majesty's ministers might so far controul those at least which depended upon them, as to prevent their inserting that abuse which must be considered as having their sanction. I endeavoured to explain to him what the influence was, which he supposed ministers to possess in England: that it amounted to nothing more than a preference which your lordship for instance might give to one paper rather than to another, by sending to it any articles of news which it might be wished to make public, but that your Lordship's influence went no further; and that if the Editor of such a paper conceived it more for his interest to continue to write after his own fancy and uncontrouled, than to be the publisher of such occasional articles, in that case all influence was at an end. I told him, that if he had remarked any abusive article in any paper of such a description, it was natural and fair to conclude that it did not depend upon Government to prevent it. He persisted in his opinion, that his majesty's ministers might keep certain papers in order, as I did in assuring him, that until the First Consul could so far master his feelings as to be as indifferent to the scurrility of the English prints, as the English Government was to that which daily appeared in the French, this state of irritation was irremediable. I told him, however, that I would report the substance of this communication to your Lordship, although I could assure him that your Lordship could add nothing to the explanation which had been given, and in such detail, by Mr. Merry from your Lordship.

“ M. Talleyrand, with great solemnity, required of me to inform him, and this by the express order of the First Consul, what were his Majesty's intentions with regard to the evacuation of Malta? He again on this occasion made great professions of his sincere desire to set aside every thing which could interrupt the good understanding between the two Governments; adding, that it was absolutely necessary, that the French Government should know what it was meant to do, when that clause in the treaty of Amiens, which stipulates the cession of Malta, should be fully accomplished. He said that another grand master would now very soon be elected; that all the powers of Europe invited so to do, with the exception of Russia, whose difficulties it was easy to remove, and without whom the guaranty would be equally complete, were ready to come forward; and that consequently the term would very soon arrive, when Great Britain could have no pretext for keeping longer possession. I informed him that I would report his conversation to your Lordship, and would have the honour of communicating to him your Lordship's answer as soon as I could receive it.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WHITWORTH.

Right Honourable Lord Hawkesbury, &c. &c. &c.

My Lord—In answer to your Excellency's dispatch of January 27, relative to the enquiry made of you, by the French Government, on the subject of Malta, I can have no difficulty in assuring you, that his Majesty has entertained a most sincere desire that the Treaty of Amiens might be executed in a full and complete manner; but it has not been possible for him to consider this Treaty as having been formed on principles different from those which have been invariably applied to every other antecedent Treaty or Convention, namely, that they were negotiated with reference to the actual state of possession of the different parties, and of the treaties or public Engagements by which they were bound at the time of its conclusion; and that if that state of possession, and of engagements, was so materially altered by the act of either of the parties as to affect the nature of the compact itself, the other party has a right, according to the law of nations, to interfere for the purpose of obtaining satisfaction or compensation for any essential difference which such acts may have subsequently made in their relative situation; that if there ever was a case to which this principle might be applied with peculiar propriety, it was that of the late Treaty of Peace; for the Negotiation was connected on a basis not merely proposed by his Majesty, but specially agreed to in an official Note by the French Government, viz. that his Majesty should keep a compensation out of his conquests for the important acquisitions of territory made by France upon the Continent. This is a sufficient proof that the compact was understood to have been concluded with reference to the then existing state of things; for the measure of his Majesty's compensation was to be calculated with reference to the acquisitions of France at that time; and if the interference of the French Government in the general affairs of Europe since that period; if their interposition with respect to Switzerland and Holland, whose independence was guaranteed by them at the time of the conclusion of the treaty of peace; if the annexations which have been made to France in various quarters, but particularly those in Italy, have extended the territory and increased the power of the French Government, his Majesty would be warranted, consistently with the spirit of the treaty of peace, in claiming equivalents for these acquisitions, as a counterpoise to the augmentation of the power of France. His Majesty, however anxious to prevent all ground of misunderstanding, and desirous of consolidating the general peace of Europe, as far as might be in his power, was willing to have waived the pretensions he might have a right to advance of this nature; and as the other articles of the definitive treaty have been ready to have carried into effect the true intent and spirit of the 10th Article, the execution of which, according to its terms, had been

rendered impracticable by circumstances which it was not in his Majesty's power to controul. A communication to your Lordship would accordingly have been prepared conformably to this disposition, if the attention of his Majesty's Government had not been attracted by the very extraordinary publication of the report of Colonel Sebastiani to the First Consul. It is impossible for his Majesty to view this report in any other light than as an official publication; for without referring particularly to explanations which have been repeatedly given upon the subject of publications in the *Moniteur*, the article in question, as it purports to be the report to the First Consul of an accredited Agent, as it appears to have been signed by Colonel Sebastiani himself, and as it is published in the official paper, with an official title affixed to it, must be considered authorized by the French Government. This Report contains the most unjustifiable insinuations and charges against the officer who commanded his Majesty's forces in Egypt, and the British army in that quarter, insinuations and charges wholly destitute of foundation, and such as would warrant his Majesty in demanding that satisfaction, which on occasions of this nature, independent Powers in a State of Amity have a right to expect from each other. It discloses, moreover, views in the highest degree injurious to the interests of his Majesty's Dominions, and directly repugnant to, and utterly inconsistent with, the Spirit and Letter of the Treaty of Peace concluded between his Majesty and the French Government; and his Majesty would feel that he was wanting in a proper regard to the honour of his Crown, and to the Interests of his Dominions, if he could see with indifference such a system developed and avowed. His Majesty cannot, therefore, regard the conduct of the French Government on various occasions since the conclusion of the definitive Treaty, the insinuations and Charges contained in the report of Colonel Sebastiani, and the views which that report discloses, without feeling it necessary for him distinctly to declare, that it will be impossible for him to enter into any further discussion relative to Malta, unless he receives satisfactory explanation on the subject of this communication.

Your Excellency is desired to take an early opportunity of fully explaining his Majesty's sentiments as above stated to the French Government.—I am, &c. HAWKESBURY.

His Excellency Lord Whitworth, K. B. &c. &c. &c.

No. 37.—Extract of a Dispatch from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, February 17, 1803.

I have the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that I saw M. de Talleyrand on Tuesday last; for the purpose of carrying into effect your Lordship's instructions of the 9th inst. I began by telling him that I had nothing new to communicate to him, but merely to confirm officially that which I had already from myself promised. I did not however pass over with the same indifference, the arguments with which your Lordship

ship has furnished me. I recapitulated them all;—the principle on which the Treaty of Amiens was founded; and the right which naturally arose from that principle, of interference on our part for the purpose of obtaining satisfaction or compensation, for any essential differences which may have arisen in the relative situation of the two countries. I instanced the cases, beginning with Italy and concluding with Switzerland, in which the territory or influence of France had been extended subsequent to the Treaty of Amiens.

I represented to him that this principle of compensation had been fully and formally admitted by the French Government, in the course of the Negotiation at Amiens. I then told him that notwithstanding the indisputable right which his Majesty might have derived of claiming some counterpoise for such acquisitions, instructions would have been given me, by which I should have been empowered to declare his Majesty's readiness to carry into effect the full intent of the tenth Article of the Treaty, if the attention of his Majesty's Government had not been roused by the official publication of Colonel Sebastiani's report to the First Consul. It was useless to recapitulate the particulars of this very extraordinary report; but I appealed to him whether it was not of a nature, exclusive of the personal allusions it contained, to excite the utmost jealousy in the minds of his Majesty's Ministers, and to demand on their part every measure of precaution. I concluded with the distinct declaration, that it was impossible for his Majesty to enter into any further discussion relative to Malta, unless he receives satisfactory explanations on the subject of the First Consul's views.

M. de Talleyrand in his reply, did not attempt to dispute the drift of my argument. He admitted, with an affected tone of candour, that the jealousy he felt on the score of Egypt, with a view to our possessions in India, was natural. But he could not admit that any thing had appeared in the conduct of the French Government in justification of the alarm we expressed. After repeating what he had said to me in a former conversation on the subject of Sebastiani's mission, which he asserted to be *strictly Commercial*, he expatiated at great length on the sincere desire of the First Consul to maintain inviolable the peace which had been so lately concluded; adding, that the situation of the French Finances was such, that were not this desire of peace in the First Consul an effect of system, it would be most imperiously dictated to him by the total impossibility in which this country found itself of carrying on that extensive state of warfare, which even a partial rupture would naturally lead to. He expressed great surprize, therefore, that any suspicion should attach, when the means of disturbing the public tranquility were, as must be well known in England, so completely wanting, and desired to know what was the nature and degree of satisfaction which his Majesty could require. On this I told him, that I could not pretend to say by what means those apprehensions, which the

conduct of this Government had raised in England, were to be allayed; but I could assure him, that in the discussion of them, we should be animated solely by a sincere desire to be convinced of the truth of his assertions, since on that depended the peace and happiness of Europe. I took this opportunity of assuring him, that although, according to his statement of the situation of France, we might possess in a greater degree the means of supporting the expence of a war, since those means arose from sources which even a state of warfare did not dry up, yet such was his Majesty's sincere desire of maintaining peace, that nothing but absolute and unavoidable necessity would ever induce him to deprive his subjects of the blessings which they begin to enjoy.

N^o. 38.— Letter from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury.

Paris, February 21, 1803.

My Lord—My last dispatch, in which I gave your Lordship an account of my conference with M. de Talleyrand, was scarcely gone, when I received a Note from him, informing me that the First Consul wished to converse with me, and desired I would come to him at the Thuilleries at nine o'clock. He received me in his Cabinet, with tolerable cordiality, and, after talking on different subjects for a few minutes, he desired me to sit down, as he himself did on the other side of the table, and began.—He told me, that he felt it necessary, after what had passed between me and M. de Talleyrand, that he should, in the most clear and authentic manner, make known his sentiments to me in order to their being communicated to his Majesty; and he conceived this would be more effectually done by himself than through any medium whatever. He said, that it was a matter of infinite disappointment to him, that the Treaty of Amiens, instead of being followed by conciliation and friendship, the natural effects of Peace, had been productive only of continual and increasing jealousy and mistrust; and that this mistrust was now avowed in such a manner as must bring the point to an issue.

He now enumerated the several provocations which he pretended to have received from England. He placed in the first line our not evacuating Malta and Alexandria, as we were bound to do by treaty. In this he said that no consideration on earth should make him acquiesce; and of the two he had rather see us in possession of the Fauxbourg St. Antoine than Malta. He then adverted to the abuse thrown out against him in the English Public Prints; but this, he said, he did not so much regard as that which appeared in the French Papers published in London. This he considered as much more mischievous, since it was meant to excite this country against him and his Government. He complained of the protection given to Georges and others of his description, who instead of being sent to Canada, as had been repeatedly promised

promised, were permitted to remain in England, handsomely pensioned, and constantly committing all sorts of crimes on the coasts of France, as well as in the interior. In confirmation of this, he told me, that two men had within these few days been apprehended in Normandy, and were now on their way to Paris, who were hired assassins, and who were employed by the Bishop of Arras, by the Baron de Rolle, by Georges, and by Dutheil, as would be fully proved in a court of justice, and made known to the world.

He acknowledged the irritation he felt against England increased daily, because every wind (I make use as much as I can of his own ideas and expressions) which blew from England brought nothing but enmity and hatred against him.

He now went back to Egypt, and told me, that if he had felt the smallest inclination to take possession of it by force, he might have done it a month ago, by sending twenty-five thousand men to Aboukir, who would have possessed themselves of the whole country in defiance of the four thousand British in Alexandria. That instead of that garrison being a means of protecting Egypt, it was only furnishing him with a pretence for invading it. *This he should not do, whatever might be his desire to have it as a Colony, because he did not think it worth the risk of a war, in which he might, perhaps, be considered as the aggressor, and by which he should lose more than he could gain. since sooner or later Egypt would belong to France either by the falling to pieces of the Turkish Empire, or by some arrangement with the Porte.*

As a proof of his desire to maintain peace, he wished to know what he had to gain by going to war with England? A descent was the only means of offence he had, and that he was determined to attempt, by putting himself at the head of the expedition. But how could it be supposed, that after having gained the height on which he stood, he would risk his life and reputation in such a hazardous attempt, unless forced to it by necessity, when the chances were that he and the greatest part of the expedition would go to the bottom of the sea? He talked much on this subject, but never affected to diminish the danger. He acknowledged that there were one hundred chances to one against him; but still he was determined to attempt it, if war should be the consequence of the present discussion; and that such was the disposition of the troops, that army after army would be found for the enterprize.

He then expatiated much on the natural force of the two countries. France, with an army of four hundred and eighty thousand men, for to this amount, it is, he said, *to be immediately completed*, all ready for the most desperate enterprizes; and England with a fleet that made her mistress of the seas, and which he did not think he should be able to equal in less than ten years. Two such countries by a proper understanding might govern the world,

world, but by their strifes might overturn it. He said, if he had not felt the enmity of the British Government on every occasion since the treaty of Amiens, there would have been nothing that he would not have done to prove his desire to conciliate; participation in indemnities as well as in influence on the Continent; treaties of commerce, in short, any thing that could have given satisfaction, and have testified his friendship. Nothing, however, had been able to conquer the hatred of the British Government, and, therefore it was now come to the point, whether we should have peace or war? To preserve peace, the treaty of Amiens must be fulfilled; the abuse in the public prints, if not totally suppressed, at least kept within bounds, and confined to the English papers; and the protection so openly given to his bitterest enemies (alluding to Georges and persons of that description) must be withdrawn. If war, it was necessary only to say so, and to refuse to fulfil the treaty. He now made the tour of Europe to prove to me, that in its present state, there was no power with which we could coalesce, for the purpose of making war against France; consequently it was our interest to gain time, and if we had any point to gain, renew the war when circumstances were more favourable. He said, it was not doing him justice to suppose, that he conceived himself above the opinion of his country or of Europe. He would not risk uniting Europe against him by any violent act of aggression; neither was he so powerful in France as to persuade the nation to go to war unless on good grounds. He said, that he had not chastised the Algerines, from his unwillingness to excite the jealousy of other powers, but he hoped that England, Russia and France would one day feel that it was their interest to destroy such a nest of thieves, and force them to live rather by cultivating their land than by plunder.

In the little I said to him, for he gave me in the course of two hours but very few opportunities of saying a word, I confined myself strictly to the tenor of your Lordship's instructions. I urged them in the same manner as I had done to M. de Talleyrand, and dwelt as strongly as I could on the sensation which the publication of Sebastiani's report had created in England, where the views of France towards Egypt must always command the utmost vigilance and jealousy. He maintained that what ought to convince us of his desire of peace, was on the one hand the little he had to gain by renewing the war, and on the other the facility with which he might have taken possession of Egypt with the very ships and troops which were now going from the Mediterranean to St. Domingo, and that with the approbation of all Europe, and more particularly of the Turks, who had repeatedly invited him to join with them for the purpose of forcing us to evacuate their territory.

I do

I do not pretend to follow the arguments of the First Consul in detail ; this would be impossible, from the vast variety of matter which he took occasion to introduce. His purpose was evidently to convince me that on Malta must depend peace or war, and at the same time to impress upon my mind a strong idea of the means he possessed of annoying us at home and abroad.

With regard to the mistrust and jealousy which he said constantly prevailed since the conclusion of the treaty of Amiens, I observed that after a war of such long duration, so full of rancour, and carried on in a manner of which history has no example, it was but natural that a considerable degree of agitation should prevail ; but this, like the swell after a storm, would gradually subside, if not kept up by the policy of either party ; that I would not pretend to pronounce which had been the aggressor in the paper war of which he complained, and which was still kept up, though with this difference, that in England it was independent of Government, and in France its very act and deed. To this I added, that it must be admitted that we had such motives of mistrust against France as could not be alledged against us, and as I was going to instance the accession of territory and influence gained by France since the treaty, when he interrupted me by saying, I suppose you mean Piedmont and Switzerland ; “ *ce sont des bagatelles :*” * and it must have been foreseen whilst the negotiation was pending ; “ *vous n’avez pas le droit d’en parler a cette heure.*” I then alledged as a cause of mistrust and of jealousy, the impossibility of obtaining justice or any kind of redress for any of his Majesty’s subjects. He asked me in what respect : and I told him that since the signing of the treaty, not one British claimant had been satisfied, although every Frenchman of that description had been so within one month after that period ; and that since I had been here, and I could say as much of my predecessors, not one satisfactory answer had been obtained to the innumerable representations which we had been under the necessity of making in favour of British subjects, and property detained in the several ports of France and elsewhere, without even a shadow of justice :—such an order of things, I said, was not made to inspire confidence ; but, on the contrary, must create mistrust. This, he said, must be attributed to the natural difficulties attending such suits, when both parties thought themselves right ; but he denied that such delays could proceed from any disinclination to do what was just and right. With regard to pensions which were granted to French or Swiss individuals, I observed that they were given as a reward for past services during the war, and most certainly not for present ones, and still less for such as had been insinuated, of a nature repugnant to the feelings of every individual in England, to the universally acknowledged loyalty and honour of the British Government. That as for any participation of indemnities

* These are mere trifles.

nities, or other accessions which his Majesty might have obtained, I could take upon myself to assure him that his Majesty's ambition led him rather to preserve than to acquire. And that with regard to the most propitious moment for renewing hostilities, his Majesty whose sincere desire it was to continue the blessings of peace to his subjects, would always consider such a measure as the greatest calamity; but that if his Majesty was so desirous of Peace, it must not be imputed to the difficulty of obtaining Allies; and the less so as those means which it might be necessary to afford such allies, for perhaps inadequate services, would all be concentrated in England, and give a proportionate increase of energy to our own exertions.

At this part of the conversation he rose from his chair, and told me that he should give orders to General Andreossi to enter on the discussion of this business with your Lordship; but he wished that I should at the same time be made acquainted with his motives, and convinced of his sincerity, rather from himself than from his Ministers.—Here then, after a conversation of two hours, during the greatest part of which he talked incessantly, conversed for a few moments on indifferent subjects in apparent good humour, and retired.

Such was nearly, as I can recollect, the purport of this conference.

It must however be observed that he did not, as M. Talleyrand had done, affect to attribute Colonel Sebastiani's mission to *commercial motives only*, but as one rendered necessary in a military point of view, by the infraction by us of the treaty of Amiens. I have the honour to be, &c.

WHITWORTH.

To the above letter is added a P. S. informing Lord Hawkesbury that M. Talleyrand had given Lord Whitworth to understand, that a project was in contemplation, by which the Integrity of the Turkish Empire would be so effectually secured as to do away every cause of doubt or uneasiness, either with regard to Egypt or any part of the Turkish dominions. He could not then, he said, explain himself farther.

No. 39. Downing-street, August 28, 1802.

My Lord—Your Excellency's dispatch of Feb. 21st has been received, and laid before the King.

I have great satisfaction in communicating to you his majesty's entire approbation of the able and judicious manner in which you appear to have executed the instructions which I gave to you in my dispatch of the 9th instant.

The account you have given of your interview with the First Consul is, in every respect, important.

It is unnecessary for me to remark on the tone and temper in which the sentiments of the First Consul appear to have been expressed, or to offer any observations

observations in addition to those so properly made by your Excellency at the time, upon several of the topics which were brought forward by the First Consul in the course of your conversation; I shall therefore content myself with referring your Excellency to my dispatch to Mr. Merry of August 28, 1802, in which the subjects of the complaints of the French government, respecting the freedom of the press, the emigrants, &c. are particularly discussed. I cannot however avoid noticing, that nothing approaching to explanation or satisfaction is stated to have been thrown out by the First Consul, in answer to the just representations and complaints of his Majesty, in consequence of the unwarrantable insinuations and charges contained in colonel Sebastiani's report against his Majesty's government—the officer commanding his forces in Egypt, and his army in that quarter: but that on the other hand, the language of the First Consul has tended to strengthen and confirm the suspicions which that publication was peculiarly calculated to excite.

“ I shall now proceed to give you some farther instructions on the language which it may be proper for you to hold respecting the charge which has been advanced against his Majesty's government, of their unwillingness to fulfil the Treaty of Amiens. The Treaty of Amiens has been in a course of execution, on the part of his Majesty, in every article in which, according to the spirit of the treaty, it has been found capable of execution. There cannot be the least doubt that Egypt is at this time completely evacuated. The delay which had arisen in the evacuation of Alexandria, was owing to accidental circumstances, the particulars of which were explained to you in my dispatch of the 30th November last; and I had every reason to believe, from the communication I had with general Andreoffy on the subject, that the French government were perfectly satisfied with the explanation which he was authorized at that time to give them respecting it.

“ With regard to that article of the treaty which relates to Malta, the stipulations contained in it (owing to circumstances which it was not in the power of his Majesty to controul) have not been found capable of execution. The refusal of Russia to accede to the arrangement, except on condition that the Maltese Langue should be abolished; the silence of the Court of Berlin, with respect to the invitation that has been made to it, in consequence of the treaty to become a guarantying power; the abolition of the Spanish priories, in defiance of the treaty to which the King of Spain was a party; the declaration of the Portuguese government of their intention to sequester the property of the Portuguese priory, as forming a part of the Spanish Langue, unless the property of the Spanish priories is restored to them; the non-election of a Grand Master:—these circumstances would have been sufficient, without any other special grounds, to have warranted his Majesty in suspending the evacuation of the island, until some new arrangement could be adjusted for its security and independence. But when it is considered how greatly the dominion, power, and influence of France have of late been extended, his

Majesty must feel that he has an incontestible right, conformably to the principles on which the treaty of peace was negotiated and concluded, to demand additional securities in any new arrangement which it might be necessary to make with a view of affecting the real objects of that treaty. And these considerations, sufficient as they might be in themselves to justify the line of conduct which his Majesty had determined to adopt, have received additional force from the views which have been recently and unreveredly manifested by the French government respecting the Turkish Dominions, and the Islands in the Adriatic *and which have been in a great degree admitted by the First Consul, in his interview with your Excellency*—views which are directly repugnant not only to the spirit, but to the letter of the Treaty of Amiens.

From the postscript in your Excellency's letter, it appears that a project was in contemplation, by which, according to the declaration of M. Talleyrand, the integrity of the Turkish territory would be secured, so as to do away every cause of doubt or uneasiness either with regard to Egypt or to any other part of the Turkish dominions. His Majesty will consider the communication of such a project as indicating a disposition on the part of the French government, to afford him explanation and satisfaction respecting some of the points which have been the subject of his representations. But after all that has passed, his Majesty cannot consent that his troops should evacuate the island of Malta, until substantial security has been provided for those objects which, under the present circumstances, might be materially endangered by their removal. I am, &c.

HAWKESBURY.

His Excellency Lord Whitworth, &c. &c.

No. 40.—Paris, 5th May 1803.

My Lord—I saw M. de Talleyrand yesterday, and acquitted myself of your Lordship's instructions. I recapitulated the several arguments therein contained, dwelling particularly on the open avowal of the First Consul's views in Egypt; and concluding with the resolution of his Majesty not to withdraw his troops from Malta, until some security should be given, that by so doing his Majesty should not expose the safety of his own dominions.

He heard me with great patience, and in answer endeavoured, as before, to convince me that there was no reason whatever for the apprehensions which were entertained. That it was true, the acquisition of Egypt had been, and perhaps still was, a favourite object of the First Consul, but that it was not so much so as to allow him to go to war for its attainment.

I then told him that what had in a particular manner excited the attention of your Lordship in my last report, was the assurance he had given me of some project being in contemplation, whereby the integrity of the Turkish Empire would be so insured, in all its parts, as to remove every doubt or apprehension. I begged him therefore, to explain himself on this subject, which I conceived to be of the utmost importance: since it was only by such means that both parties could be satisfied. He then gave me to understand,

stand, that what he had termed a project was nothing more than what had been expressed in the First Consul's message to the Legislative Body, when he says, that there is a French Ambassador at Constantinople, who is charged to give every assurance of the disposition of France to strengthen, instead of to weaken, that Government. I expressed a doubt whether this, or any other parole security, would be considered as sufficient in such a transaction. Hereupon he repeated the question—What then is the security which you require, and which the First Consul can give? This, I told him, must be the subject of negotiation on which we were willing to enter; and I trusted that the French government would bring into it the same temper, and the same real desire to conciliate, which was manifested by his Majesty's ministers.

M. de Talleyrand now informed me, that the First Consul had, five or six days ago, ordered instructions to be sent to general Andreossy, by which he was to require an immediate and categorical answer to the plain question—Whether his Majesty would or would not cause Malta to be evacuated by the British troops? That he concluded this communication was already made, and that he expected to learn the result of it in a very few days; adding, that all the First Consul wanted was to know precisely on what he had to depend.

I could not help lamenting this precipitate measure, since it could answer no good purpose and would only tend to introduce into the discussion ill humour and offended dignity, in the place of dispassionate reasoning. I begged him, however, to be prepared, and to prepare the First Consul, to meet with more opposition to his will than he had been accustomed to on similar occasions.

I told him, that his Majesty was willing to discuss the point in dispute with fairness and candour, but certainly never would be intimidated into acquiescence; and I repeatedly urged, that if he wished well to the peace of the two countries, he should prepare the First Consul for the consequences which might naturally be expected from this step, and thus prevent the effect of any sudden gust of ill humour. He was unwilling to admit that there could be any chance of satisfying the First Consul short of a compliance with his wishes, founded, as he pretended, on good faith.

Our conversation ended here, and I wait the result of General Andreossy's communication with the utmost impatience.—I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

WHITWORTH.

P. S. In the interval between the writing and transcribing the above dispatch, I have taken another opportunity of seeing M. de Talleyrand, and I am glad to find, that (for what purpose I know not) he had represented the instructions to General Andreossy as much more absolute and offensive than they really are. I found him to-day entirely disposed to give me another opinion, and to convince me that the First Consul, far from wishing to carry matters to extremity, was desirous to discuss fairly and without passion, a point, which he admitted was of importance to both

countries.—He repeatedly assured me, that much as the First Consul might have the acquisition of Egypt at heart, he would sacrifice his own feelings to the preservation of peace; and henceforth seek to augment his glory by improving and consolidating the internal situation of the country, rather than by adding to its possessions.

(Signed)

w.

Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c. &c. &c.

No. 41.—Translation of the Note from General Andreoffy to Lord Hawkesbury, dated March 10, 1803.

The undersigned Ambassador and Minister Plenipotentiary of the French Republic to his Britannic Majesty, has received from the First Consul, express orders to require from the British government some explanations respecting the protracted occupation of the Island of Malta by the English troops. He had hoped that verbal communication would have been sufficient to have produced satisfactory expositions, by preparing the way for the mutual conciliation of minds and interests, a conduct which has been prescribed to him by his ardent zeal for the maintenance of harmony between the two countries, and of the peace of Europe, objects of the solicitude of the French government: But the undersigned thinks he can no longer delay complying with the instructions he had received, and he has therefore the honor of addressing the following observations to his Excellency Lord Hawkesbury, which recal to recollection the spirit and leading features of the verbal communications which he has previously made to him.

By the conditions of the fourth paragraph of the 10th article of the Treaty of Amiens, the English troops were to evacuate the island of Malta and its dependencies three months after the exchange of the ratifications. Ten months have elapsed since the ratifications have been exchanged, and the English troops are still at Malta. The French troops on the contrary, who were to evacuate the Neapolitan and Papal states, have not waited the expiration of the three months which were granted to them to withdraw, and have quitted Tarentum, the fortifications of which they had re-established, and where they had collected 100 pieces of cannon. What can be alledged in justification of the delay in evacuating Malta? Has not the tenth article of the Treaty of Amiens provided for every thing? And the Neapolitan troops being arrived, under what pretext do those of England still remain there? Is it because all the powers enumerated in the sixth paragraph have not yet accepted the guaranty which is devolved upon them? But this is not a condition that relates to the evacuation of the island; and besides, Austria has already sent its act of guaranty; Russia itself has made only a single difficulty which has been done away by the accession of the First Consul to the modifications proposed, unless indeed England itself throws obstacles in the way, by refusing to accede to the proposals of Russia, which, after all, could not affect the engagements of His Britannic Majesty, who, according to the express conditions of the treaty, is to evacuate the island of Malta within three months, placing

placing it under the guard of the Neapolitans, who are to garrison it, until the definitive arrangements of the Order are settled. It should therefore seem impossible, and it would be without example in the history of nations, were His Britannic Majesty to refuse to execute a fundamental article of the pacification, of the very one, which, in the drawing up of the preliminaries, was considered as the first, and as requiring to be settled previously to every other point. Indeed the First Consul who cordially relies on the intentions of His Britannic Majesty, and cannot suppose them to be less open and generous than those with which he is animated, has hitherto been unwilling to attribute the delay of the evacuation of the island of Malta, to any other than to maritime circumstances.

The undersigned is, therefore, charged to require explanations on this point, and he is persuaded that the British Ministry will be the more anxious to furnish such as will be satisfactory, as they must be sensible how necessary they are for the maintenance of harmony, and how important they are for the honour of the two nations.

The undersigned avails himself of this opportunity to renew to Lord Hawkesbury, the assurances of his high consideration.

(Signed)

F. ANDREOSSY.

Portland Place, 10th March, 1803.

No 42.

Paris, March, 12, 1803.

My Lord—The Messenger Mafon arrived yesterday morning early, with your Lordship's letter of the 7th, informing me, that in consequence of the preparations in the ports of France and Holland, which though avowedly intended for colonial service, might, in the event of a rupture, be turned against some part of the British dominions, His Majesty had judged it expedient to send a message to both houses of parliament, recommending, in terms void of offence, the adoption of such measures as may be consistent with the honour of His crown, and the security of His dominions, and at the same such as will manifest His Majesty's disposition for the preservation of peace.

I beg leave to return your Lordship my thanks for having apprized me of this circumstance by a special messenger; I found, however, on going to M. de Talleyrand, at two o'clock, that he was already informed of it. He was just setting out to communicate it to the First Consul, and appeared under considerable agitation. He returned with me to his cabinet, and though he told me he was pressed for time, he suffered me to relate the circumstance without interruption. I endeavoured to make him sensible that the measure was merely precautionary, and not in the least degree intended as a menace. I concluded my observations by repeating that it was merely a measure of self security, founded on the armaments which were carrying on in the ports of France and Holland, remarking at the same time, that had not these armaments been as notorious as they were, the very circumstance of the First Consul's determination to augment so considerably his army in time of peace, would have been a full and sufficient motive for such a measure of precaution.

M. de

M. de Talleyrand now informed me that he was already acquainted with the business; that a messenger had that morning arrived, who had brought him a copy of the message, which he communicated to me. I could draw from him no reply whatever to my observations. He confined himself strictly to the assurance which he has so repeatedly made, that there was no foundation whatever for the alarm which was felt by His Majesty's ministers; that the First Consul was pacific; that he had no thoughts whatever of attacking His Majesty's dominions, unless forced to do so by a commencement of hostilities on our part; that he should always consider the *refusal to evacuate Malta as such a commencement of hostilities*; and that as we had hitherto hesitated to do so, he was justified in adopting the measures which might eventually be necessary. He disclaimed every idea of the armaments fitting out in the Dutch ports having any other destination than to the Colonies, and concluded, that for his part he could not comprehend the motives which had necessitated a resort to such a measure on the part of His Majesty's Government,

He then desired leave to go to the First Consul, promising that he would let me know the result when we met at dinner at the Prussian minister's. He did not come there till near seven o'clock, and when we rose from dinner, he took me aside and informed me, that although the First Consul had been highly irritated at the unjust suspicion which His Majesty's government entertained, yet he would not allow himself to be so far mastered by his feelings, as to lose sight of the calamities with the present discussion might entail upon humanity. He dwelt much on this topic, and explained the measures to which he would be obliged to resort; he said, that if England wished to discuss fairly, he wished the same; that if England prepared for war, he would do the same; and that if England should finally determine on hostilities, he trusted to the support of the French Nation in the cause of honour and of justice. It was in vain that I repeated that England did not wish for war; that peace was as necessary to us as it could be to France; that all we desired, and all that we were contending for was security; that every thing proved to us that that security was threatened by the First Consul's views on Egypt; and that consequently our refusal to evacuate Malta was become as much a necessary measure of precaution, as the defence of any part of His Majesty's dominions. To this kind of reasoning, M. de Talleyrand opposed the moderation of the First Consul, his great self denial, and his determination to sacrifice even the most favourite points to his sincere desire to avoid a rupture.

M. de Talleyrand now told me, that, in order to facilitate my communication of the First Consul's sentiments, he would communicate to me a paper which he had that morning drawn up with him; that it was not to be considered as any thing absolutely official; that it was a memorandum to assist me, but such as I might, if I chose, transmit to your Lordship. I now inclose it. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) WHITWORTH.

Right Honourable Lord Hawkesbury, &c. &c. &c.

Note verbale, referred to in No. 42.—Translation.

I. If his Britannic Majesty in his message means to speak of the expedition of Helvoetsluys, all the world knows that it was destined for America, and that it was on the point of failing for its destination, but in consequence of his Majesty's message the embarkation and putting to sea are about to be countermanded.

II. If we do not receive satisfactory explanation respecting these armaments in England, and if they actually take place, *it is natural* that the First Consul should march 20,000 men into Holland, since Holland is mentioned in the message.

III. These troops being once in the country, *it is natural* that an encampment should be formed on the frontiers of Hanover; and moreover, that additional bodies should join those troops which were already embarked for America, in order to form new embarkations, and to maintain an offensive and defensive position.

IV. *It is natural* that the First Consul should order several camps to be formed at Calais, and on different points of the coasts.

V. It is likewise *in the nature of things*, that the First Consul, who was on the point of evacuating Switzerland, should be under the necessity of continuing a French army in that country.

VI. It is also *the natural consequence of all this* that the First Consul should send a fresh force into Italy in order to occupy, in case of necessity, the position of Tarennum.

VII. England arming, and arming with so much publicity, will compel France to put her armies on the war establishment, a step so important as cannot fail to agitate all Europe.

The result of all these movements will be to irritate the two countries still more. France will have been compelled to take all these precautions in consequence of the English armaments, and nevertheless every means will be taken to excite the English nation by the assertion, that France meditates an invasion. The whole British population will be obliged to put themselves under arms for their defence, and their export trade will, even before the war, be in a state of stagnation throughout the whole extent of the countries occupied by the French arms.

The experience of nations, and the course of events prove, that the distance between such a state of things and actual hostility, is unfortunately not remote.

As to the differences, of which mention is made in His Britannic Majesty's message, we know not of any that we have with England; for it cannot be imagined that a serious intention can have existed in England of evading the execution of the Treaty of Amiens, under the protection of a military armament. Europe well knows that it is possible to attempt the dismemberment of France, but not intimidate her.

No. 43.—Paris, March 14, 1803.

My Lord—The Messenger Mason went on Saturday with my dispatches of that date, and until yesterday, Sunday, I saw no one likely to give me any farther information such as I could depend upon, as to the effect which His Majesty's message had produced

duced on the First Consul. At the court which was held at the Thuilleries upon that day, he accosted me evidently under considerable agitation. He began by asking me if I had any news from England. I told him that I had received letters from your Lordship two days ago. He immediately said, and so you are determined to go to war? No! I replied, we are too sensible of the advantages of peace. †*Nous avons, said he, déjà fait la guerre pendant quinze ans.*—As he seemed to wait for an answer, I observed only, *C'en est déjà trop.*—*Mais, said he, vous voulez la faire encore quinze années, et vous m'y forcez.*—I told him that was very far from his Majesty's intentions.—He then proceeded to Count Maréow and the Chevalier Azara, who were standing together at a little distance from me, and said to them, *Les Anglois veulent la guerre, mais s'ils sont les premiers à tirer l'Épée, je serai le dernier à la remettre. Ils ne respectent pas les traités. Ils faut dorenavant les couvrir de crepe noire.* He then went his round, in a few minutes he came back to me, and resumed the conversation, if such it can be called, by something personally civil to me. He began again—*Pourquoi des armemens? Contre qui des mesures de précaution? Je n'ai pas un seul Vaisseau de Ligne dans les ports de France; mais si vous voulez armer, j'armerai aussi; si vous voulez vous battre, je me battraï aussi. Vous pourrez peut-etre tuer la France, mais jamais l'intimidier.*—*On ne voudroit, said I, ni l'un ni l'autre. On voudroit vivre en bonne intelligence avec elle.—Il faut donc respecter les traités,* replied he; *Malheur à ceux qui ne respectent pas les traités; ils en seront responsable à toute l'Europe.* He was too much agitated to make it advisable for me to prolong the conversation; I therefore made no answer, and he retired to his apartment, repeating the last phrase.

It is to be remarked, that all this passed loud enough to be overheard by two hundred people who were present, and I am persuaded that there was not a single person who did not feel the extreme impropriety of his conduct, and the total want of dignity, as well as of decency, on this occasion.

† *Literal Translation of the Conversation between the First Consul and Lord Whitworth.*

F. Consul. We have been already at war for fifteen years.

L. Whitworth. That's too long.

F. Consul. You wish to continue it for fifteen years more, and you compel me thereto.

F. Consul. (To Count Maréow and Chev. Azara) The English wish for war, but if they are the first to draw the sword I shall be the last to sheath it. They have no respect to treaties—henceforth all treaties must be covered with mourning.

F. Consul. (To Lord Whitworth) Why those preparations for war? against whom are those precautionary measures taken? I have not a single ship of the line in the ports of France: but if you will arm I will also arm:—If you will fight I will also fight. You may possibly be able to destroy France but never to intimidate her.

L. Whitworth. We would wish to do neither the one or the other, we would wish to be in friendship with her.

F. Consul. You must then respect treaties.—Woe to those who disregard them! for they will be answerable to all Europe.

I propose taking the first opportunity of speaking to Mr. Talleyrand on this subject

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

WHITWORTH.

Right Honourable Lord Hawkesbury, &c. &c. &c.

No. 44.—Extract of a Dispatch from Lord Hawkesbury to Lord Whitworth, dated March 15, 1803.

I sent your Excellency a Copy of the Note presented to me by General Andreoffy on the Tenth instant, and a Copy of the answer which I have this day by his Majesty's commands returned to it.

No. 45.—NOTE.

The undersigned, his Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has laid before the King the Note of his Excellency the French Ambassador of the 10th instant.

In obeying the commands of his Majesty, by returning an official answer to this Note, the undersigned feels it necessary for him to do little more than repeat the explanations which have been already given on more than one occasion by himself verbally to General Andreoffy, and by Lord Whitworth to M. Talleyrand, on the subject of the Note, and of the points which appear to be connected with it. He can have no difficulty in assuring the French Ambassador, that his Majesty has entertained a most sincere desire that the Treaty of Amiens might be executed in a full and complete manner, but it has not been possible for him to consider this Treaty as having been founded on principles different from those which have been invariably applied to every other antecedent treaty or convention, namely, that they were negotiated with reference to the actual *state of possession* of the different parties, and to the *treaties or public engagements* by which they were bound at the time of its conclusion; and that if that *state of possession* and of *engagements* as so materially altered by the act of either of the parties as to affect the nature of the compact itself, the other party has a right according to the law of nations, to interfere for the purpose of obtaining satisfaction or compensation for any essential difference which such acts may have subsequently made in their relative situation; that if there ever was a case to which this principle might be applied with peculiar propriety, it was that of the late treaty of Peace: for the negotiation was conducted on a basis not merely proposed by his majesty, but specially agreed to, in an official note, by the French Government, viz. *that his Majesty should keep a compensation out of his conquests, for the important acquisition of territory made by France on the Continent*. That is a sufficient proof that the compact was understood to have been concluded in relation to the then existing state of things; for the measure of his majesty's compensation was to be calculated with reference to the acquisitions of France at that time; and if the interference of the French Government in the general affairs of Europe since that period; if their interposition with respect to Switzerland

land and Holland, whose independence was guaranteed by them at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace; if the acquisitions which have been made by France in various quarters, but particularly those in Italy, have extended the territory and increased the power of France, his majesty would be warranted, consistently with the spirit of the Treaty of Peace, in claiming equivalents for these acquisitions, as a counterpoise to the augmentation of the power of France. His majesty, however, anxious to prevent all ground of misunderstanding, and desirous of consolidating the general Peace of Europe, as far as might be in his power, was willing to have waved the pretensions he might have a right to advance of this nature; and as the other Articles of the Definitive Treaty have been in a course of execution on his part, so he would have been ready to have carried into effect an arrangement conformable to the true intent and spirit of the 10th Article; the execution of that arrangement, according to its terms, having been rendered impracticable by circumstances which it was not in his Majesty's power to controul. Whilst his Majesty was actuated by these sentiments of moderation and forbearance, and prepared to regulate his conduct in conformity to them, his attention was particularly attracted by the very extraordinary publication of the Report of Colonel Sebastiani to the First Consul. This Report contains the most unjustifiable insinuations and charges against his Majesty's Government; against the Officer commanding his forces in Egypt, and against the British army in that quarter; insinuations and charges wholly destitute of foundation, and such as would have warranted his Majesty in demanding that satisfaction, which on occasions of this nature, independant Powers, in a state of amity, have a right to expect from each other. It discloses, moreover, views in the highest degree injurious to the interests of his Majesty's dominions, and directly repugnant to, and utterly inconsistent with, the spirit and letter of the treaty of Peace concluded between his Majesty and the French Government. His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris was accordingly directed to make such a representation to the French Government, as his Majesty felt to be called for by the imputations of the nature above described; by the disclosure of purposes inconsistent with good faith, and highly injurious to the interests of his people; and as a claim had recently been made by the French Government on the subject of the evacuation of Malta, Lord Whitworth was instructed to accompany this representation by a declaration on the part of his Majesty, that before he could enter into any further discussions relative to that island, it was expected, that satisfactory explanations should be given upon the various points respecting which his majesty had complained. This representation and this claim, founded on principles incontestably just, and couched in terms the most temperate, appear to have been wholly disregarded by the French Government; no satisfaction has been afforded, no explanation whatever has been

given;

given; but on the contrary, his majesty's suspicions of the views of the French Government with respect to the Turkish Empire have been confirmed and strengthened by subsequent events. Under the present circumstances his majesty feels that he has no alternative, and that in regard to his own honour and to the interests of his people, makes it necessary for him to declare, that he cannot consent that his troops should evacuate the island of Malta, until substantial security has been provided for those objects which under the present circumstances, might be materially endangered by their removal.

With respect to several of the positions stated in the Note, and grounded on the idea of the 10th article being executed in its literal sense, they call for some observations. By the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens, the island of Malta was to be restored by his majesty to the Order of St. John, upon certain conditions. The evacuation of the island, at a specified period, formed a part of these conditions; and if the other stipulations had been in a due course of execution, his majesty would have been bound, by the terms of the treaty, to have ordered his forces to evacuate the island: but these conditions must be considered as being all of equal effect; and if any material parts of them should have been found incapable of execution, or if the execution of them should from any circumstances have been retarded, his majesty would be warranted in deferring the evacuation of the island until such time as the other conditions of the article could be effected; or until some new arrangement could be concluded which should be judged satisfactory by the contracting parties. The refusal of Russia to accede to the arrangement, except on condition that the Maltese Language should be abolished; the silence of the court of Berlin, with respect to the invitation that has been made to it, in consequence of the treaty, to become a guarantying power; the abolition of the Spanish priories, in defiance of the treaty to which the King of Spain was a party; the declaration of the Portuguese Government, of their intention to sequester the property of the Portuguese priory, as forming a part of the Spanish Language, unless the property of the Spanish priories was restored to them—these circumstances would have been sufficient, without any other special grounds, to have warranted his Majesty in suspending the evacuation of the island. The evacuation of Tarentum and Brundisium is in no respect connected with that of Malta. The French Government were bound to evacuate the kingdom of Naples by their treaty of peace with the King of Naples, at a period antecedent to that at which this stipulation was carried into effect.

The French Government were bound likewise by engagements with the Emperor of Russia, to respect the independence of the kingdom of Naples; but even admitting that the departure of the French troops from Tarentum depended solely on the article of the treaty of Amiens, their departure is, by the terms

of the treaty, to take place at the same period as the other evacuations in Europe; namely, one month after the ratification of the definitive treaty; at which period both Porto Ferrajo and Minorca were evacuated by his Majesty's forces; whereas the troops of his Majesty were in no case bound to evacuate the island of Malta antecedent to the period of three months after the ratification of the definitive treaty; and even in that event, it must be considered as depending upon the other parts of the arrangement being in a course of execution. With respect to the assertion in the note, that the Neapolitan troops were to form the garrison of Malta until the period when the arrangement relative to the order could be carried into effect, it will appear, by a reference to the article, that by the preliminary paragraph, the island was to be restored to the Order upon the condition of the succeeding stipulations, and that it was only from the period when the restitution to the Order had actually taken place, that by the 12th paragraph the Neapolitan troops were to form a part of the garrison.

The undersigned has thus stated, with all the frankness which the importance of the subject appears to require, the sentiments of his Majesty on the note delivered to him by General Andreossi, and on the points in discussion between the two countries.

His Majesty is willing to indulge the hope, that the conduct of the French Government on this occasion may be influenced by principles similar to those which have invariably influenced his own. That as far as possible all causes of distrust, and every impediment to a good understanding between the two countries, may be completely and effectually removed, and that the Peace may be consolidated on a secure and lasting foundation.

The undersigned requests General Andreossi to accept the assurances of his high consideration.

Downing-street, March 15, 1803.

(Signed)

HAWKESBURY.

His Excellency General Andreossi, &c. &c. &c.

No. 46.

“ Paris, March 17, 1803.

My Lord—I called yesterday on M. de Talleyrand, to converse with him on the subject of what had passed on Sunday last at the Thuilleries. He had been since that day so fully occupied with his expeditions to different foreign Courts, that I had no opportunity of seeing him sooner. I told him, that I had been placed by the First Consul in a situation which could neither suit my public nor my private feelings. That I went to the Thuilleries to pay my respects to the First Consul, and to present my countrymen, but not to treat of political subjects; and that unless I had the assurance from him, that I should not be exposed to a repetition of the same disagreeable circumstances, I should be under the necessity of discontinuing my visits to the Thuilleries. M. de Talleyrand assured me, that it was very far from the First Consul's intention to distress me; but he had felt himself

himself personally insulted by the charges which were brought against him by the English Government; and that it was incumbent upon him to take the first opportunity of exculpating himself in the presence of the Ministers, of the different powers of Europe. He assured me that nothing similar would occur.

(Signed)

WHITWORTH.

The Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c. &c. &c.

No. 47.

Paris, March 18, 1803.

My Lord—I received your Lordship's dispatch, with its inclosures, this morning early; and I learnt at the same time that a messenger had arrived from General Andreoffy to M. de Talleyrand, shortly after M. de Talleyrand sent to desire I would call on him, which I accordingly did. He told me that he had not only received your Lordship's note to the French Ambassador but also the sentiments of the First Consul upon it, which he was desirous to communicate to me, before he dispatched the messenger. This he did, and I refer your Lordship to the communication which General Andreoffy will make, according to his instructions, without loss of time.

From the tenor of this note, it appears that the government is not desirous to proceed to extremities; that is to say, it is not prepared so to do; as therefore it expresses a willingness to enter on the discussion of the point, which appears according to their conception, or rather to the interpretation they choose to give to it, the most material. This of course is the safety of Egypt. The First Consul declares in the note, as M. Talleyrand did repeatedly to me, that he would be willing to enter into any engagement by which such a security as would fully quiet our apprehensions, might be given on the part of the French Government. On the subject of Malta, the First Consul maintains that he cannot listen to any compromise;—with regard to Egypt he is willing to enter into any engagement which may be thought sufficient.

I told him that he had departed from the letter and the sense of your Lordship's note, by confining the question to Malta alone. That note had comprehended other most important considerations. That the best method of bringing the discussion to a speedy conclusion, such as his Majesty's Government appeared to wish, was to take it up on a broader scale. But that at the same time his Majesty's Government would not refuse to lend itself to any thing reasonable which might be suggested. There was, however, I told him, one distinction to be made in the situation of the two governments in the discussion of this question. By our possession of Malta France was not threatened, but the reverse was the case, should the access to Egypt be opened by its evacuation. I have the honour to be, &c

(Signed)

WHITWORTH,

To the Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c. &c. &c.

No. 48

No. 48.

Downing-street, March 22, 1803.

My Lord—With respect to the subject of your Excellency's dispatch of March 14, I have it in command to signify to you his Majesty's pleasure, that you take the earliest opportunity to represent to M. Talleyrand, the surprize with which his Majesty learnt the conduct which the First Consul had observed towards your Excellency in the instance to which that dispatch refers; and you will add, that as his Majesty has a right to expect that his Ambassador should be treated with the respect and attention due to the dignity of the Sovereign whom he represents, it will be impossible for you to present yourself on any days of ceremony to the First Consul, unless you receive an assurance that you will never be exposed to a repetition of the treatment which you experienced on the occasion.

Although your Excellency appears to have anticipated this instruction in one of your most recent conversations with M. de Talleyrand, I nevertheless think it right to enable your Excellency to state to that Minister, the sense which the King entertains of this transaction. I am, with great truth and respect, &c.

(Signed)

HAWKESBURY.

His Excellency Lord Whitworth, K. B. &c. &c. &c.

No. 49.—Downing-street, April 3, 1803.

My Lord—I inclose to your Excellency, for your information, copies of the official Note delivered to me on the 20th ult. by General Andreossi, and of the answer which, by his Majesty's command, I this day returned to that communication.

I am, with great truth and respect, &c.

(Signed)

HAWKESBURY.

His Excellency Lord Whitworth, K. B. &c. &c. &c.

(Translation of Inclosure referred to in 49.)

The undersigned General of Division, Ambassador and Minister Plenipotentiary from the French Republic, has laid before his Government the Note addressed to him by his Excellency Lord Hawkesbury. He has received orders to make the following Answer to the observations therein contained.

The object of this Note appears to be to explain his Britannic Majesty's Message; and to give some elucidations which had been demanded respecting the execution of the Treaty of Amiens. The First Consul will not make any complaint relative to the extraordinary and unexpected assertions of this act issued by his Britannic Majesty. Not one of them is founded. His Britannic Majesty believes that his Kingdom is menaced by preparations made in the Ports of Holland and France. He has been deceived: The First Consul has made no preparations. There were at the time of the message, but two frigates in the Roads of Holland, and but three corvettes in the Road of Dunkirk. How can his Britannic Majesty's Ministers have been deceived on facts so evident? His Britannic Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris and at the Hague have seriously to reproach themselves if they have

have credited information so evidently false, and if they did not foresee that they thereby exposed their Government to err in the most important deliberations. Was it not conformable to the usage practised among nations, first to demand explanations, and thus to take means for being convinced of the falsehood of the intelligence which the ministers might have received? Must not the least effects of the omission of this practice be, to bring on the ruin of families, and to carry confusion, uncertainty, and disorder into all the commercial affairs of both Nations? The First Consul knows, both from his own sentiments, and judging of other People by the French, that a great Nation can never be terrified. He believes that good policy and the feelings of true dignity ever inspire the sentiment of esteem for a rival nation, and never the design of menacing her. A great nation may be destroyed, but not intimidated.

The second part of his majesty's message consists of another assertion no better founded. His Britannic majesty makes mention of discussions, the success of which is doubtful. What are these discussions? What official notes, what protocols prove the opening, the progress, the vicissitudes of a debate? Can a state of difficulties, which leads to an alternative of peace or war, spring up unawares without commencement, without progression, and lead without distinction to an appeal to arms before all the means of conciliation have been exhausted. In this case, the appeal has been publicly made before it could be known that there was room for misunderstanding. The termination of the discussions was announced before they had begun. The issue of a difficult discussion has been declared before it arose. What would Europe, what would both nations think, if they knew that these discussions, announced by his Britannic majesty as so difficult to terminate, were unknown to the French Government; and that the First Consul, on reading the message, could not comprehend the meaning of either of the declarations therein contained? He has also abstained from any ostensible step; and whatever may have been the clamour, the activity, the provocations of war, which have taken place in England since that message, he has given no orders, he has made no dispositions, no preparations. He places his glory in an affair of this nature, wholly in being taken in an unprovided state. He will continue in this system of honest frankness, until his Britannic majesty has reflected fully on the part he proposes to take.

In Lord Hawkesbury's note, an opinion is expressed, that the French Republic has increased its power since the peace of Amiens. This is a decided error. Since that epoch, France has evacuated a considerable territory. The French power has received no degree of augmentation. If his Britannic majesty is determined to make war, he may alledge all the pretexts he pleases. He will find few less founded.

As to the complaints made respecting the publications which may have appeared in France, they are of an order too secondary to be capable of influencing such a decision. Are we then returned to the age of tournaments? motives of this nature might have authorized, four centuries ago, the combat of thirties; but they cannot, in this age, be a reason for a war between the two countries. It might suffice in this respect to reply to his Excellency, that a representation has been made by him on the subject to the Government of the Republic; and that, if it was but justice to grant satisfaction, the First Consul had a right to expect that which was required by M. Otto, in his note of the 22d Thermidor last, upon grounds more serious and more just. Is it possible that the English Ministry can have been ignorant, that ever since the conclusion of the treaty of Amiens, the English press has not ceased to spread through Europe the rage of war, the discredit of peace, and shameless and boundless outrages against every thing which is the object of the love and veneration of the French people?

A few days after the ratification of peace, one of his Britannic Majesty's Ministers declared that the peace establishment must be considerable; and the distrust excited by this declaration made in Parliament with as much bitterness as impropriety, furnished a commentary for the exaggeration and alarm which were circulated in despicable pamphlets and newspapers as contemptible as those libels. Since that time, these writers have found themselves invariably supported in their intolent observations by particular phrases taken from the speeches of some leading Members of Parliament. These speeches scarcely to be exceeded by the news writers themselves, have, for these 18 months, tended to encourage insult against other Governments to that degree, that every European must be offended, and every reasonable Englishman must be humiliated, by such unheard-of licentiousness.

What if we connect with these sallies, proceedings more offensive and serious; the indulgence granted to French criminals, publishing daily outrages in the French language; the still more inexcusable toleration extended to villains covered with crimes, and plotting assassinations incessantly, such as Georges, who still continues to reside at London protected, and having a considerable establishment; in a word, the little justice which has been shewn to all our representations. How are we to account for the publicity of the complaint which his Britannic Majesty has thought proper to make respecting some indefinite wrongs which he has hitherto thought unnecessary to bring before the First Consul.

The Chief Consul has had cause to be convinced that all his representations on these points were useless, and that his Britannic Majesty, regardless of the neighbouring powers, was resolved to authorize every thing within his dominions; but he did not on that account entertain a doubt

doubt of the continuance of peace, nor alarm Europe with the notification of war. He confined himself to this principle of conduct, to permit or prevent in France with respect to England whatever should be permitted or prevented in England with regard to France.

He has, however, expressed, and again expresses his wish, that means should be adopted to prevent in future any mention being made of what is passing in France, either in the official discussions, or in the polemical writings in England, as in like manner in the French official discussions and polemical writings no mention whatever should be made of what is passing in England.

Lord Hawkesbury mentions an article in a newspaper, containing a report of a French Colonel. In serious discussions an answer on this point might be dispensed with; but it is neither a long nor difficult matter.

A Colonel in the English army has published a work in England, filled with the most atrocious and disgusting calumnies against the French army and its General. The lies it contains have been contradicted by the reception which Colonel Sebastiani experienced. The publicity of his report was at once a refutation and a reparation which the French army had a right to expect. On his arrival in Egypt, this officer, to his great astonishment, found the English army there, although they should have evacuated it, and the Turks prodigiously alarmed at the continuance of the English army, and at its relations with the natives in rebellion and open revolt against the Sublime Porte.

He must have conceived that the treaties which connect us with the Porte, and by which we have guaranteed to it the integrity of its possessions, compelled us to unite ourselves with that power. It was natural to think that England meant to declare war from the instant she refused to execute the articles of the treaty. For after all, France is not reduced to such a state of debasement as to suffer treaties made with her to be executed or not at pleasure.

Hence the researches made by this Officer, as to the forces which were in Egypt, and as to the position occupied by the English Army.—But Egypt has since been restored to the dominion of its lawful sovereign, and the idea of a rupture between the two nations, on account of the engagement contracted with the Porte, no longer exists.

(Inclosure referred to in No. 49.)

The undersigned, his Majesty's principal Secretary of State for foreign affairs, has laid before the King the note of his Excellency General Andreossi, of the 29th of last month.

His Majesty has been induced, by that spirit of moderation and forbearance which have invariably governed his conduct in every part of his communications with the French Government, to

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abstain

abstain from making many observations which the perusal of this note may naturally have suggested to his mind. His Majesty has perceived with great regret, that the French Government continue to withhold all satisfaction and explanation on the points on which he has complained; and that at the time when they evade all discussion on the subject of his representations, they persist in their requisition that the island of Malta should be forthwith evacuated by his forces.

His Majesty can never so far forget what is due to himself and to his people, as to acquiesce in such a course of proceeding; he has therefore judged it expedient to give instructions to his Ambassador at Paris, to ascertain distinctly from the French Government, whether they are determined to persevere in withholding all satisfaction and explanation on the points on which his Majesty has complained,—or whether they are disposed, without delay, to give such satisfaction and explanations upon the present state of affairs as may lead to an arrangement which may be calculated to adjust the differences at present subsisting between the two governments? It is his Majesty's anxious desire, that by this mode of proceeding an end may be put to that state of suspense and irritation which must be so injurious to the interests of both countries; and that the two Governments, actuated by the same principles of justice and moderation, may be led to concur in such measures as are most likely to conduce to their permanent tranquillity.

HAWKESBURY.

Downing-street, April 3, 1803.

His Excellency General Andreossi, &c. &c. &c.

No. 50.

Downing-street, April 4, 1803.

My Lord—It is become essential, that the discussions which have been for some time subsisting between his Majesty and the French Government should be brought to an issue within as short a time as consistent with the deliberation which must be given to objects of so much importance.

The last Note presented by General Andreossi, in the name of his Government, in answer to my Note of the 15th of last month, evades all explanation, and even all discussion of the points on which complaint has been made by his Majesty.

If the French Government should seriously intend to persist in this course of proceeding, there can be no hopes of a successful termination to the present negotiation. It is important therefore, that you should ascertain distinctly, in the first instance, whether they are disposed to enter into explanation on the points on which his Majesty has complained, and to come to such an arrangement as may be calculated to adjust the differences at present subsisting between the two Countries; and for this purpose will present a Note to the effect of that which is herewith inclosed. It is possible that the French Government may continue to evade all discussion on the points in question, and confine themselves to a categorical demand,

demand, that Malta should be immediately evacuated. In that case, it is his Majesty's pleasure, that you should declare the impossibility of the relations of amity continuing to subsist between the two countries, and the necessity that you will be under of leaving Paris within a certain time. But if, on the other hand, they should shew a readiness to enter into discussion, and to give reasonable satisfaction and explanation, it is important that you should be informed, without loss of time, of the sentiments of his Majesty's Government, as to what might be considered as an equitable adjustment of the differences between the two Governments at this moment.

I have, therefore, by his Majesty's Command, inclosed the project of an arrangement, which, under the present circumstances, would meet the ideas of his Majesty's Government: which would afford security for those objects which are considered as endangered by the unequivocal disclosure of the views of the First Consul, and which, at the same time, might entirely save the honour of the French Government. I am, &c.

HAWKESBURY.

His Excellency Lord Whitworth, &c. &c. &c.

(First Inclosure referred to in No. 50.)

The Undersigned, his Britannic Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary, has received the orders of his Court to make the following communication to the French Government.

His Majesty has perceived, with great regret, that the French Government continue to withhold all satisfaction and explanation on the points on which he has complained; and that at the time when they evade all discussion on the subject of his representations, they persist in their requisition that the Island of Malta should be forthwith evacuated by his forces. His Majesty can never so far forget what is due to himself, and to his people, as to acquiesce in such a course of proceeding. He has therefore commanded the Undersigned to ascertain distinctly from the French Government, whether they are determined to persevere in withholding all satisfaction and explanation upon the points on which his Majesty has complained, or whether they are disposed, without delay, to give such satisfaction and explanation upon the present state of affairs as may lead to an arrangement, which may be calculated to adjust the differences at present subsisting between the two Governments?

It is his Majesty's anxious desire that by adopting this mode of proceeding, an end may be put to that state of suspense and uncertainty which must be so injurious to the interests of both countries; and that the two Governments, actuated by the same principles of justice and moderation, may be led to concur in such measures as are most likely to conduce to their permanent tranquillity.

(Signed)

WHITWORTH.

(Second Inclosure referred to in No. 50.)

Heads of an Arrangement to be concluded by Treaty or Convention between His Majesty and the French Government.

Malta to remain in perpetuity in the possession of His Majesty. The Knights of the Order of St. John to be indemnified by His Majesty for any losses of property which they may sustain in consequence of such an arrangement.

Holland and Switzerland to be evacuated by the French troops.

The island of Elba to be confirmed by his Majesty to France, and the King of Etruria to be acknowledged.

The Italian and Ligurian Republics to be acknowledged by his Majesty, provided an arrangement is made in Italy for the King of Sardinia, which shall be satisfactory to him.

No 51.—Extract of a Dispatch from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, April 7, 1803.

I received your Lordship's dispatches of the 4th inst. with their inclosures, yesterday evening;—and shall probably in the course of the day have an opportunity of communicating to M. Talleyrand the note, which I shall translate for that purpose.

No. 52:

Paris, April 7, 1803.

My Lord—Since writing the preceding dispatch, I have seen M. de Talleyrand, and communicated to him the inclosed Note, which I trust your Lordship will find as close a translation as possible, of that which I received from your Lordship. He read it over with much attention, and when he had done he appeared to be in expectation of some other communication. Upon desiring he would explain himself, he said, that he was in hopes I should have furnished him with the heads of those points, on which it was affirmed in the Note that the French Government had so repeatedly refused all explanation and satisfaction. I told him, that it would have been entirely useless to repeat what had been so often urged in vain; that he could not but know that the explanation required to the conduct of the French Government, and the system of aggrandizement which it had constantly pursued since the conclusion and in direct violation of the Treaty of Amiens, founded as it indisputably was on the state of possession of the two countries at the time; that with regard to the satisfaction, it evidently referred to the unjustifiable insinuations and charges against his Majesty's Government, against the officer commanding his forces in Egypt and against the British army in that quarter, contained in the official report of Colonel Sebastiani. He was by no means disposed to admit, that either of these cases could justify the assertion of the French Government having refused explanation and satisfaction, on the ground that no notice had been taken of these Transactions but in a very cursory manner;—nor had any explanation ever been required as to any particular

particular transaction, whether in Italy or elsewhere, and if it had, it would immediately have been given;—and that the Language of Colonel Sebastiani was not to be put in any comparison with that that used by Major Wilson, in his account of the campaign of Egypt. I urged the difference of a common publication like that to which he alluded, and a report to the First Consul published by him in his official Paper. On this occasion, M. de Talleyrand was disposed to call in question the authenticity of the *Moniteur*. In short the most ungrounded assertions were substituted for arguments; and amongst these, I cannot but place that so often repeated, of the First Consul's having entirely given up all idea whatever of Egypt, consequently we could have no pretext for retaining Malta.

He assured me for the rest, that he would communicate it this evening to the First Consul, and that to-morrow he should in all probability have a communication to make in return. I have the honour to be, &c.

WHITWORTH.

The Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c. &c. &c.

(Inclosure referred to No. 52.)

This is merely a translation of the first inclosure referred to in No. 50.

No. 53.

“ Paris, April 9, 1803.

My Lord—In my conversation yesterday evening with M. de Talleyrand, I found him, after he had seen the First Consul, more disposed to contest the substance of the Note which I had presented the day before, than to offer any further explanation. He said, that in order to proceed regularly, it would be necessary that the French Government should be informed precisely what were the objects which had created such uneasiness, and on which it was alleged all explanation had been refused. That although this had, perhaps, been touched upon in general conversation, yet no specific charge had been adduced in such a manner as to demand a formal explanation. I told him, that if the object of the French Government was to protract the present state of suspense and uncertainty, that object might be answered to the extent indeed of a very few days, by forcing me to such a reference; but I must at the same time declare to him, that it could be productive of no advantage, and would serve only to provoke such a recapitulation of the system and conduct which France had pursued since the Treaty of Amiens, as would have all the appearance of a manifesto, every item of which would carry conviction to every individual in Europe; that it appeared therefore more likely to answer the end which both parties proposed, that of hastening the conclusion of an amicable arrangement, to take up the business on the basis which I should propose, and by which they would admit no more than what was incontrovertible, namely, that if the French Government exercised a right of extending its influence and territory, in violation of the spirit of the treaty of Amiens,

Amiens, Great Britain had, if she chose to avail herself of it, (which I was confident she would not do further than was necessary as a measure of security), an undoubted right to seek a counterpoise. He did not seem inclined to dispute this position, but rather to admit that such a right did exist, and might be claimed in consequence of the acquisitions which had been made by France.—On the point of satisfaction I found him much more obstinate. He said that the First Consul was hurt at the expression (*Satisfaction*), to which he gave an interpretation I had never understood belonging to it, as implying superiority; so that if the British Government required satisfaction of the French, it arrogated to itself a superiority. I told him, what certainly must be understood by every one, that the demand of satisfaction implied that one party had been offended by another, and of course had a right to demand such satisfaction; that an inferior had an equal right with his superior to demand it; but in the case in question there was perfect equality, and consequently there was no offence to be found but in the conduct which rendered such an appeal necessary. The discussion of this point took up a considerable time without producing any thing decisive.

We at last came to the main point of the business; and on this I cannot say any real progress has been made. M. de Talleyrand repeated to me that the First Consul had nothing more at heart than to avoid the necessity of going to war, and that there was no sacrifice he would not make, short of his honour, to obtain this end. Is there, said M. Talleyrand, no means of satisfying both parties? for at the same time that the First Consul insists, and will always insist, on the full execution of the treaty, he will not object to any mode by which you may acquire the security you think so necessary.—You are not satisfied with the independence of Neapolitan troops; what others will answer the purpose? He then started the idea of a mixed garrison, composed of English, French, Italians, Germans, &c. He begged that I would refer once more to your Lordship, and submit the inclosed paper, which he drew out in my presence. I told him that we were only losing time by such a reference; that my instructions were positive, and had certainly not been sent me without the fullest consideration. I could not, however, refuse what he so earnestly requested;—and your Lordship will see by the paper how the matter rests after this conference. I will confess to your Lordship, that my motive for consenting to forward this sort of proposal is, that supposing we should find the First Consul as obstinate as he now appears to be on the point of abandoning Malta to us in perpetuity, and that a temporary possession might be considered as the next best thing, something of this kind might derive from it. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

WHITWORTH.

To the Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c. &c. &c.

(Translation)

(Translation of inclosure referred to in No. 53.)

The conversation with M. Talleyrand to day has led us to this result : Every thing which may tend to violate the independence of the Order of Malta, will never be consented to by the French Government. Every thing which may tend to put an end to the present difficulties, or be agreeable to the English Government, and which shall not be contrary to the Treaty of Amiens, the French Government have no objection to make a particular convention respecting it. The motives of this convention shall be inserted in the preamble, and shall relate to the respective grievances concerning which the two Governments shall think it adviseable to come to an understanding with each other.

No. 54.—Extract of a Dispatch from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, April 14, 1803.

Since my last the negotiation is at a stand, in the expectation I suppose, of the answer which may arrive, to the overture which I communicated to your Lordship on the 9th instant, and which is expected here to produce a good effect, notwithstanding the little hope I have given. To-morrow I shall, in all probability, be in possession of this answer from your Lordship, and be enabled to speak still more positively.

No. 55.

Downing-street, April 13, 1803.

My Lord—His Majesty has received from his Chargé de Affaires at Hamburgh, the most extraordinary account of the conduct of Monsieur Reinhard, the French Minister at that place, with respect to a most gross and unwarrantable libel upon His Majesty's Government. He has been assured that the French Minister, having proposed the insertion of that libel in the official Gazettes of the town of Hamburgh, and the insertion of it having in the first instance been refused, the French Minister went so far as to demand, in his official capacity, the insertion of that article by order of the Senate. His Majesty is unwilling to believe that the French Government could have authorized so outrageous an attack upon His Majesty and his Government, and so daring a violation of the independence of a neutral state. It is his Majesty's pleasure, that you should communicate these circumstances to the French Government, and state at the same time the impossibility of bringing the present discussions to an amicable conclusion, unless some satisfaction shall be given to his Majesty, for the indignity which has thus been offered to him in the face of all Europe by the French Minister at Hamburgh.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

HAWKESBURY.

His Excellency Lord Whitworth, K. B. &c. &c. &c.

No. 56.

Downing-street, April 13, 1803.

My Lord—Your Excellency's dispatches have been received, and laid before the King.

His Majesty has observed with great satisfaction, the admission by the French Government of the Justice of his claim to some compensation

compensation in consequence of the increased power and influence of France, since the period of the conclusion of the Definitive Treaty.

Although, under the circumstances of your conversation with M. Talleyrand, and particularly after the Note Verbale which he gave to you, it might have been expedient that you should have deferred presenting the project contained in my dispatch No. 7, in the form of a project, it is desirable that you should communicate without delay in some mode or other, the contents of that project, for the purpose of ascertaining distinctly whether the conditions are such as to induce the French Government to give way upon the question of Malta. These conditions appear to his Majesty so well calculated to save the honour of the French Government on the subject of Malta—if the question of Malta is principally considered by them as a question of honour—and at the same time hold out to them such important advantages, that the success of the proposition is at least worth trying, particularly as the result of it might be productive of the most easy means of adjusting the most material of our present differences.

With respect to the assertion so often advanced and repeated by M. Talleyrand in your last conversations of the non-execution of the treaty of Amiens relative to Malta, I have only to observe again, that the execution of that article is become impracticable, for causes which it has not been in the power of his Majesty to controul. That the greatest part of the funds assigned to the support of the Order, and indispensably necessary for the independence of the Order and defence of the island, have been sequestered since the conclusion of the definitive treaty, in direct repugnance to the spirit and letter of that treaty; and that two of the principal Powers, who were invited to accede as guarantees to the arrangement, have refused their accession, except on the conditions that the part of the arrangement which was deemed so material relative to the Maltese inhabitants should be entirely cancelled. The conduct of the French Government since the conclusion of the definitive treaty, gives his Majesty a right, which is now at length admitted by themselves, to demand some compensation for the past, and security for the future. Such compensation could never be considered as obtained by the possession of an island, which would entail a very heavy expence on this country;—and the degree of security which would be provided by these means, would only be such as his Majesty, under the present circumstances, is entitled to demand.

I observe in the note verbale of M. Talleyrand, he makes use of the expression, *the independence of the Order* of Malta. If this is meant to apply to the Order exclusively, his Majesty would be willing, for the preservation of peace, that the Civil Government of the island should be given to the Order of St. John; the Maltese enjoying the privileges which were stipulated in their favour in the Treaty of Amiens; and that

that, conformable to principles which have been adopted on other occasions, the fortifications of the Island should be garrisoned for ever by the troops of his Majesty.

In the event of either of these propositions being found unattainable, his Majesty might be disposed to consent to an arrangement by which the Island of Malta would remain in his possession for a limited number of years, and to waive in consequence his demand for a perpetual occupation, provided that the number of years was not less than ten, and that his Sicilian Majesty could be induced to cede the sovereignty of the Island of Lampedusa for a valuable consideration. If this proposition is admitted, the Island of Malta should be given up to the Inhabitants at the end of that period, and it should be acknowledged as an independent State. In this case, his Majesty would be ready to concur in any arrangement for the establishment of the Order of St. John in some other part of Europe.

You will not refuse to listen to any proposition which the French Government may be disposed to make to you with a view to an equivalent security for those objects in regard to which his Majesty claims the possession or occupation of Malta; but the three propositions to which I have above alluded, appear, at the present moment, to furnish the only basis for a satisfactory arrangement; and you will decline receiving any proposition which does not appear to you to offer advantages to his Majesty as substantial as that which I have last stated.

It is very desirable that you should bring the negotiation to an issue, if possible, without referring to his Majesty's Government for further instructions, after the receipt of this dispatch; and if you should be of opinion, that there are no hopes of bringing it to a favourable conclusion, you may inform M. Talleyrand of the necessity you will be under, after a certain time, to leave Paris. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

HAWKESBURY.

His Excellency Lord Whitworth, K. B. &c. &c. &c.

No. 57.—Is a letter from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, informing his Lordship that the conduct of M. Rheinhardt respecting the publication in the Hamburgh Newspaper was considered by the French Government as highly reprehensible, and that every satisfaction was promised on that point.

No. 58.

Paris, April 18, 1803.

My Lord—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's dispatches of the 13th inst.

I saw Joseph Bonaparte immediately on the receipt of your Lordship's dispatch; and endeavoured to convince him of the importance of preventing the ultimatum which would inevitably follow the rejection of what I had to propose. I will briefly state, that on finding it perfectly impracticable to establish the principle of our keeping possession of Malta in perpetuity, I delivered

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delivered

livered to him in writing the second proposal I had to make. He did not fail to observe, that by this modification the difficulty which he considered as insurmountable was not removed; that although the Order was restored, it could not be considered as independant, and, in fact, Malta would belong to that power which had possession of the forts—I enforced the adoption of this plan by every reason which could serve to recommend it; but the possession in perpetuity was constantly urged as a difficulty which nothing could remove. Our conversation lasted near two hours. I confess that I gained no solid ground of hope that the project, which he assured me he would take to the First Consul at St. Cloud, would be adopted. But he said that he was not without hope that he might be authorized to propose to me the occupation of the fortresses for a term of years. It was my wish, that such a proposal should come from him rather than from me. I told him that I did not well see how such a tenure would suit us; but that I wished too sincerely to avoid the fatal extremities to which I saw the discussion was tending, not to give any reasonable proposal which might be made on their part every assistance in my power. This proposal originated with him, and was therefore received by me merely as a matter which I would refer to your Lordship. If however I can bring the matter an immediate conclusion, and without further reference to your Lordship on the principle of our retaining possession of the fortresses of Malta for a term of years, not less than that pointed out by your Lordship, and with the assurance that this Government will not oppose the Cession of the Island of Lampedosa, I shall have great pleasure in announcing to your Lordship such a conclusion.

The conversation which I had the same morning with M. de Talleyrand, differed in no wise from what I have above mentioned. He suggested all the possibility of coming to an arrangement on the ground of a temporary occupation, and I made him the same answer.

(Translation of Inclosure referred to in No. 58.)

His Majesty will consent, for the sake of preserving Peace, that the Government of the Island of Malta shall be given to the Order of St. John; the Maltese enjoying those privileges which have been granted on former occasions. The fortifications of the Island shall be occupied in perpetuity by the troops of his majesty.

No. 59.—Paris April 20, 1803.

My LORD—I had hoped that the First Extraordinary Messenger I should have had occasion to send, would have been to announce to your Lordship, that the differences between the two Governments were adjusted on one of the modifications pointed out to me by my last instructions from your Lordship. In this expectation I am deceived. I saw Joseph Bonaparte the night before last, before I had sealed up my dispatches of that evening

ing to your Lordship; but as all he said tended only to justify the hope I had given your Lordship, in those dispatches, I added nothing to them. He assured me positively, that I should hear from M. de Talleyrand in the course of yesterday morning, and that a meeting would be appointed in order to settle the term of years for which the First Consul might be induced to consent to the cession of Malta.

I am sorry to say, that no such summons has been received by me, neither has any further notice been taken of the business. So that I feel, that I should betray the confidence your Lordship may place in me, were I to delay any longer requesting, that I may be immediately furnished with the terms on which his majesty's ministers would be willing to conclude, in order that I may propose them in the form of an ultimatum; and that at the expiration of the period allowed for deliberation, I may be authorized not only to declare that I am to leave Paris, but actually so to do, unless in the intermediate time, the French Government should accede to our demands.—I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

WHITWORTH.

Right Hon. Lord Hawkebury, &c. &c. &c.

No. 60.—(Extra.)—Downing-street, April 23, 1803.

My Lord—If, upon the receipt of this dispatch, it shall not have been in your power to bring the Negotiation to a conclusion on any of the propositions to which I have above referred, it is his Majesty's pleasure that you should communicate, officially, to the French Government, that you have gone, in point of concession, to the full extent of your instructions; and that, if an arrangement, founded upon one of these propositions, cannot be concluded without further delay, you have received his Majesty's commands to return to England.

His Majesty can only consent to relinquish the permanent occupation of Malta by his forces, on the conditions that the temporary possession shall not be less than ten years; that the authority, civil and military, shall, during that period, remain solely in his Majesty; and that, at the expiration of that period, the island shall be given up to the inhabitants, and not to the Order; and provided likewise, that his Sicilian Majesty shall be induced to cede to his majesty the island of Lampedosa. It is indispensable that, as a part of this arrangement, Holland should be evacuated by the French Troops within a short period after the conclusion of a Convention by which all those provisions are secured. His Majesty will consent to acknowledge the new Italian States, upon the condition that stipulations in favour of his Sardinian Majesty, and of Switzerland, form a part of this arrangement.

It is his majesty's pleasure that, in the event of the failure of the negotiation, you should delay your departure from Paris no longer than may be indispensably necessary for your personal convenience,—and that you should in no case remain there, after

the receipt of this dispatch, more than seven days, I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

HAWKISBURY.

No. 61.—Paris, April 23, 1803.

My Lord—As I heard nothing from M. de Talleyrand, I called on him on Thursday, in order to learn the effect of the proposal which I had made conformably to your Lordship's instructions, on the basis of a perpetual possession of the Forts of Malta, on re-establishing the Order in the Civil Governments of the Island. He told me, that if I had called on him sooner, he should two days ago have communicated to me the First Consul's answer, which was, that no consideration on earth should induce him to consent to a concession in perpetuity of Malta, in any shape whatever: and that the re-establishment of the Order was not so much the point to be discussed, as that of suffering Great Britain to acquire a possession in the Mediterranean. I told him that I did not call sooner, because I had been given to understand, that he would have himself proposed it to me, for the purpose of communicating the answer of the First Consul; and that it did not in any shape become me to put myself on the footing of a solicitor in this transaction. After some conversation, and finding, (what I most sincerely believe to be the case) that the First Consul's determination was fixed on the point of a possession of Malta in perpetuity: I repeated to him what I had previously suggested to Joseph Bonaparte, the Modification which I had to propose, namely, that for the sake of peace, his Majesty would be willing to wave his pretensions to a possession in perpetuity, and would consent to hold Malta for a certain number of years to be agreed upon, on the condition that no opposition should be made on the part of the French government to any Negotiation his Majesty might set on foot with his Sicilian Majesty for the acquisition of the island of Lampedosa. We discussed this proposal in a conversation of some length, and I made use of all the arguments which have been furnished me by your Lordship, or which occurred to me in its favour. I begged him particularly to recollect that we were in actual possession of the object, and that therefore every modification tending to limit the possession, was in fact a concession on the part of his Majesty, and a proof of his desire to sacrifice to his love of peace the just claim which he had acquired in consequence of the conduct of France, and which had recently been admitted, of a much more considerable compensation and counterpoise. M. de Talleyrand did not seem disposed to dispute any of my positions, and I left him, I confess, fully impressed with the idea that the next day (Friday) I should find him prepared to treat on this ground, and that the only difficult point to be arranged would be the number of years for which Malta should be ceded to his Majesty.

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Your Lordship will conceive my surprize when on seeing him the next day, he told me that although he had not been able to obtain from the First Consul all we wished, still the proposition he had to make would, he trusted, be such as fully to answer the purpose. He then said that the First Consul would, on no terms, bear either of a perpetual or a temporary possession of Malta; that his object was the execution of the Treaty of Amiens; and that rather than submit to such an arrangement as that I had last proposed, he would even consent to our keeping the object in dispute for ever: On the ground that in the one there was an appearance of generosity and magnanimity: but in the other, nothing but weakness and the effect of coercion: That therefore his resolution was taken, and what he had to propose was the possession we required of the island of Lampedosa, or of any other of the small isles of which there are three or four between Malta and the Coast of Africa; that such a possession would be sufficient for the object we had in view, which was a station in the Mediterranean as a place of refuge and security for any Squadron we might find it convenient to keep in that sea. I suffered him to expatiate a considerable time, and without interruption, on the great advantages we were to derive from such an acquisition, as well as on the confidence which the First Consul reposed in our pacific intention in lending a hand to such an establishment.

[In reply Lord W. stated, how urgent his orders were to bring the negociation to an issue, and that the spirit of procrastination would only have effect to make him communicate, in the form of an ultimatum, the terms he had offered, and from which he could not depar]

To all I could say (continues his Lordship) M. Talleyrand objected the dignity and honour of the First Consul, which could not admit of his consenting to any thing which might carry with it the appearance of yielding to a threat. I told him that it never could be admitted that the First Consul had a right to act in such a manner as to excite jealousy and create alarm in every state of Europe, and when asked for explanation or security say that it was contrary to his honour or his dignity, to afford either. Such arguments might perhaps do when applied to some of those Governments with which France has been accustomed to treat, or more properly to dictate to, but never could be used to Great Britain; that his Majesty had a right to speak freely his opinion, and possessed also the means, whenever he choose to employ them, of opposing a barrier to the ambition of any individual, or of any state, which should be disposed to threaten the security of his dominions, or the tranquility of Europe.

Our conversation concluded by M. de Talleyrand's assuring me that he would report the substance of it to the First Consul in the evening, and that probably he should have occasion to see me on the following day. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

WHITWORTH.

To the Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c. &c. &c.

No.

My Lord—The conversation I had on Saturday morning with M. Talleyrand has produced nothing from which I can draw a more favourable conclusion as to the result of the negotiation than when I last addressed your Lordship. He told me, that although he had seen the First Consul the night before, he had nothing to add to what he had communicated to me on Friday; that the First Consul was determined not to give his consent to our retaining Malta, either in perpetuity or for a term, although of the two he would prefer the former tenure as the less repugnant to his feelings; that he was therefore ordered to repeat the proposal he had lately made me, of acceding to our demand of Laapedosa or any of the neighbouring islands; and that as our object was to obtain a settlement in the Mediterranean he imagined that which we had ourselves pointed out would answer every purpose we might have in view. But, at all events, the First Consul neither could nor would relinquish his claim to the full execution of the Treaty of Amiens. To this I could only repeat what I had already said to him on the inadequacy of such a proposal, and of the impossibility in which I found myself to transmit it to your Lordship. I lamented the course which the Negotiation was taking, and that the First Consul should have so little regard to the dreadful consequences which must ensue, as to suffer them to be outweighed by a mistaken notion of dignity. And I added, that notwithstanding the acquiescence which he might have met with from others, the plea of its being incompatible with the dignity of the French Government to give satisfaction or security, when both might with Justice be demanded, could never be admitted by Great Britain.

M. de Talleyrand heard every thing I could say with the utmost patience, notwithstanding he had nothing satisfactory to say, and seemed unwilling to break up the conference. He constantly brought forward the same inadmissible proposal, requesting that I would at least communicate it to your Lordship. This I told him I could not refuse to do, since every thing which passed between him and me must of course make the subject of my reports to your Lordship. I declared, however, at the same time, that I should not think myself by any means authorised to suspend the execution of any instructions I might receive, tending to bring the Negotiation to an issue, in the expectation of any change which such a proposal might produce. All I could do, and that I would certainly do, would be to communicate the ultimatum, if his Majesty should think proper to furnish me with it, confidentially to M. de Talleyrand, before I presented it officially to him as Minister for Foreign Affairs. He assured me, that he should consider such a conduct as a further proof of my desire to conciliate, and that he could not yet forbear hoping that the differences might be adjusted. I repeated that if his hope was founded on the expectation of his Majesty's be-
ing

ing induced to recede from his demand, it would be deceiving himself to cherish it.

The remainder of the conversation turned on the calamities which would follow the failure of our endeavour to avoid a rupture. He insinuated that Holland, Naples, and other countries connected with Great Britain, would be the first victims of the war. I asked him whether he thought that such a conduct would add to the glory of the First Consul, or whether the falling on the innocent and defenceless would not rather tarnish it, and ultimately unite against him, not only the honest men in his own Country, but every Government in Europe? That it certainly would excite more detestation than terror in England, at the same time that it would serve to impress upon us still more strongly the necessity of omitting no means of circumscribing a power so perniciously exerted. I could not help adding, that although no act of hostility had actually taken place, yet the inveteracy with which our commerce, our industry, and our credit, had been attacked in every part to which French influence could be extended, did in fact almost amount to the same, since it went to prove, in addition to the general system of the First Consul, that his object was to pursue under the mask of peace, the same line of conduct in which the preceding Governments had acted.

I now trust entirely to the effect of the Ultimatum, which will at least convince him that we are in earnest, and that he has nothing to expect from protraction.

(Signed)

WHITWORTH.

The Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c. &c.

P. S. Your Lordship's dispatches of the 23d with their inclosures, were delivered to me by Shaw this evening at nine o'clock. I shall see M. de Talleyrand to-morrow morning.

No. 63. Extract of a Dispatch from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, April 27, 1803.

I communicated to M. de Talleyrand the purport of my instructions of the 23d, yesterday at four o'clock. He immediately asked me if the possession of Malta was still insisted upon? I told him most certainly it was; and I repeated to him the particulars of the terms on which it was yet possible to conclude the business. That these were, the possession of Malta for ten years, during which period the authority, civil and military, was to remain solely in his Majesty, and that at the expiration of that term, it was to be given up the inhabitants, and not to the Order; provided also, that his Sicilian Majesty shall be induced to cede to his Majesty the island of Lampedosa; that Holland should be evacuated by the French troops within a month after the conclusion of a Convention by which all these provisions shall be secured; and that his Majesty would consent to acknowledge the new Italian states, provided stipulations were made in favour of his Sardinian Majesty and of Switzerland.

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I had no sooner made known these conditions than M. de Talleyrand told me it would be perfectly unnecessary to delay the official communication, for, as the possession of Malta was still insisted upon, although for a term, the First Consul would not consent to them. I accordingly did repeat them to him in the manner he desired; when he told me that he comprehended perfectly what we required, but that in similar cases it was usual to state the demand in writing, and he desired I would give him a note on the subject. I told him that I would repeat to him once more, or as often as he pleased, the express terms which I had stated to him, and that as my communication to him was verbal, I should of course be content with an answer in the same form. He consented at length to receive it, and to communicate to me the First Consul's answer as soon as possible. I desired that he would recollect that Tuesday next must be the day of my departure:

No. 64.—Extract of a dispatch from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkebury, dated Paris, April 29, 1803.

This morning a person came to me whom I suspect of being employed by the First Consul for the purpose of ascertaining my sentiments, and told me that I should, in the course of the day, receive a letter from M. de Talleyrand, drawn up under the inspection of the First Consul, which although not exactly what I might wish, was however so moderate as to afford me a well-grounded hope, and might certainly be sufficient to induce me to delay, for a short time, my departure. I told him that it would be a matter of great satisfaction to me to perceive a probability of bringing the negociation to a favourable issue: and that I should be extremely sorry to spoil the business by any useless precipitation. But it must be recollected that I acted in conformity to instructions; that those instructions were positive: that by them I was enjoined to leave Paris on Tuesday next, unless in the intermediate time certain conditions were agreed to. Having received no letter in the course of the day, about four o'clock I went to M. Talleyrand; I told him that my anxiety to learn whether he had anything favourable to tell me, brought me to him, and in case he had not, to recall to his recollection that Tuesday was the day on which I must leave Paris, and to request that he would have the necessary passports prepared for me and my family. He appeared evidently embarrassed, and after some hesitation observed, that he could not suppose I should really go away, but that at all events the First Consul never would recall his ambassador. To this I replied, His Majesty recalled me in order to put an end to the negociation, on the principle that even actual war was preferable to the state of suspense in which England, and indeed all Europe, had been kept for so long a space of time.

No. 65.—Extract of a Dispatch from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkebury, dated May 2, 1803.

Another day has passed over without producing any change, I determined to go myself to M. de Talleyrand, and to deliver, instead of sending, the inclosed letter. I told him it was with great reluctance that I came to make this last application to him. That I had long since informed him of the extent of the term which had been assigned for my stay at Paris, and that as I had received to this moment no answer whatever to the proposal I repeatedly made, I could no longer delay requiring him to furnish me with the necessary passports for the return of myself, my family, and the remainder of the mission to England. He hoped, my departure not so near; said he would communicate my letter, and what I had said, to the First Consul immediately, and that in all probability I should hear from him this evening.

Translation of inclosure in No. 65. Paris, May 2, 1803.

Sir—When I had the honour, on Tuesday last, of communicating to you officially the last propositions which I was instructed by my Court to submit to the French Government, for the sake of removing the present difficulties, I had the honour to announce to you, that in case the First Consul should not consent to these propositions, I should find myself under the necessity of leaving Paris in eight days. We are nearly arrived at the end of this period, without my having received any answer to this communication. It remains for me only, therefore, to obey the orders of the King my master to return to him; and for this purpose I entreat you, Sir, to have the goodness to furnish me with the necessary passports.

(Signed)

WHITWORTH.

His Excellency M. de Talleyrand.

No. 66.—Extract of a Dispatch from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkebury, dated Paris, Wednesday Morning, May 4, 1803.

Soon after I had dispatched the messenger the night before last, with my dispatches of the 3d, I received a communication from M. de Talleyrand, of which I inclose a Copy. On the following morning I returned the answer, of which the inclosed is a copy:

After this I concluded, of course, that there was an end to the Negotiation. I had for some days past been preparing for my departure; every measure was taken for setting out at four o'clock this morning, and we were expecting only the passports which I had demanded, for the purpose of ordering post-horses. The day and the evening passed without the passports having been sent and while we were deliberating on the motives of such a delay, about twelve o'clock at night, a Gentleman who was with me received a communication which convinced me that it was not meant to give me my passports without another attempt, and I was, therefore, not surprised when about one o'clock I received the inclosed note from M. de Talleyrand.

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Translation

Translation of the first inclosure, referred to in No. 66.

The undersigned has reported to the First Consul the conversation which he had with his Excellency Lord Whitworth on the 6th of this month, and in which his Excellency announced, that his Britannic Majesty had ordered him to make, verbally, in his name, the following demands:

1st. That his Britannic Majesty should retain his troops at Malta for ten years.

2d. That the Island of Lampedosa should be ceded to him in possession.

3d. That the French troops should evacuate Holland. And that if no convention on this basis should have been signed within a week, his Excellency Lord Whitworth had orders to terminate his mission, and to return to London. On the demand made by the Undersigned, that Lord Whitworth would, in conformity to the usage of all ages and of all Countries, give in writing what he himself called the *Ultimatum* of his Government, his Excellency declared, that his instructions expressly forbid him to transmit on this object any written note. The intentions of the First Consul being entirely pacific, the undersigned dispenses with making any observation on so new and so strange a manner of treating on affairs of this importance. And, in order to give a fresh testimony of the value which he attaches to the continuance of Peace, the First Consul has directed the undersigned to make the following notification in the accustomed style and forms.

As the Island of Lampedosa does not belong to France, it is not for the First Consul either to accede to or refuse the desire testified by his Britannic Majesty, of having this island in his possession.

With regard to the Island of Malta, as the demand made respecting it by his Britannic Majesty would change a formal disposition in the Treaty of Amiens, the First Consul cannot but previously communicate it to his Majesty the King of Spain, and to the Batavian Republic, Contracting Parties to the said Treaty, in order to know their opinion; and besides, as the Stipulations relative to Malta have been guaranteed by their Majesties the Emperor of Germany, the Emperor of Russia, and the King of Prussia, the Contracting Parties to the Treaty of Amiens, before they agree to any change in the article of Malta, are bound to concert with the guaranteeing Powers. The First Consul will not refuse this concert, but it belongs not to him to propose it, since it is not he who urges any change in the guaranteed stipulations.

With regard to the evacuation of Holland by the French troops, the First Consul has no difficulty in directing the undersigned to repeat that the French troops shall evacuate Holland at the instant that the stipulations of the Treaty of Amiens shall be executed in every quarter of the globe.

CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

Paris, 12 Florcal, Year 11, (2d May, 1803.)

No.

Translation of the second inclosure in No. 66. Paris, 3d May, 1803.

The undersigned, in answer to the note which M. de Talleyrand transmitted to him yesterday evening, has the honour to observe to him, that the King has had no other motive in seeking to accelerate the proceedings of the negotiation, than to relieve as soon as possible the two countries the most interested, and Europe in general, from the state of suspense in which they are placed. It is with great regret that he perceives nothing in his Excellency's note which can correspond with this intention, and consequently nothing that can justify him in delaying to obey the orders of his Court. It remains therefore, only to request the Minister for Foreign Affairs to give him the means of obeying them, by furnishing him with the necessary passports for his return.

(Signed)

WHITWORTH.

Translation of the third inclosure in No. 66. Paris, 3d May, 1803.

My Lord—Having to-morrow morning to make to you a communication of the greatest importance, I have the honour to inform you of it without delay, in order that you may not expect this evening the passports which you had demanded. I propose that you should call to-morrow, at half past four, at the Foreign Department.

CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

No. 67.—Extract of a Dispatch from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkebury, dated Paris, Wednesday Evening, May 4, 1803.

The inclosed note will shew your Lordship, that the idea which has been thrown out, is to give Malta to Russia.

My only inducement for having undertaken to refer again to your Lordship, is to avoid every reproach of precipitation. The difference will be but five days, and I have declared, that I see so many objections to the plan, that although I would not refuse their solicitation to send it, I could give no hope whatever of its being accepted as a ground of negotiation.

Translation of inclosure in No. 67.

The undersigned has submitted to the First Consul his Britannic Majesty's Ambassador's Note of the 3d instant.

After the last communication addressed to his Excellency, it is more difficult than ever to conceive how a great, powerful, and enlightened nation, can be willing to take upon itself to declare a war which would be accompanied by such heavy calamities, and the cause of which would be so insignificant, the object in question being a miserable rock.

His Excellency must have been aware that the two-fold necessity of making an agreement with the guaranteeing Powers of the treaty of Amiens, and of violating a compact in the execution of which the honour of France, the security for the future, and the good faith of the diplomatic intercourse between the nations of Europe, were so deeply interested, had imposed a law upon the French Government of discarding every proposition

position diametrically contrary to the treaty of Amiens.— Nevertheless the First Consul, accustomed for two months to make every species of sacrifice for the maintenance of peace, would not reject a mezzo termino of a nature to conciliate the interests and dignity of the two countries.

The First Consul is ready to consent that the island of Malta shall be placed in the hands of one of the three powers who have guaranteed its independence, either Austria, Russia, or Prussia, with a proviso that as soon as France and England shall have come to an agreement upon this article, they shall unite in their requisition to engage the other Powers, either contracting, or acceding to the Treaty of Amiens, to consent to it.

Paris, 14 Floreal.

CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

No. 68, Extract.

Downing-street, May 7, 1803.

The French Government propose that his Majesty should give up the Island of Malta to a Russian, Austrian, or Prussian garrison. If his Majesty could be disposed to wave his demand for a temporary occupation of the Island of Malta, the Emperor of Russia would be the only Sovereign to whom, in the present state of Europe, he could consent that the island should be assigned: and his Majesty has certain and authentic information, that the Emperor of Russia would on no account consent to garrison Malta. Under these circumstances his Majesty perseveres in his determination to adhere to the substance of his third project as his ultimatum: as, however, the principal objection stated by the French Government to his Majesty's proposition is understood to be confined to the insertion of an article in a public treaty by which his Majesty shall have a right to remain in the possession of the island of Malta for a definite number of years, his Majesty will consent that the number of years (*being in no case less than ten*) may be stated in a secret article; and the public articles may be agreed to conformably to the inclosed project. By this expedient, the supposed point of honour of the French Government might be saved. The independence of the island of Malta would, in principle, be acknowledged, and the temporary occupation of his Majesty would be made to depend *alone on the present state of the island of Lampedusa.*

I observe by your dispatch, you did not consider yourself as authorized to deliver to the French Government any note or project in writing. The words of my dispatch were, that you were to communicate the terms *officially*, which left it at your discretion to communicate them verbally, or in writing, as you might judge most expedient. You were certainly right in communicating them, in the first instance, verbally; but as so much stress has been laid by M. Talleyrand on this distinction, it is important that I should inform you, that his Majesty neither had nor has any objection to your delivering the inclosed project as an ultimatum, accompanied by a short note in writing.

(Signed)

HAWKESBURY.

No. 70.—

No. 70.—Extract of a dispatch from Lord Whithworth to Lord Hawk-
bury, dated Paris, May 12, 1803.

The Messenger Sylvester, as I mentioned in my last dispatch, returned on the 9th at 12 o'clock; and I wrote to M. de Talleyrand, desiring him to name an hour when I might communicate to him the purport of my instructions. I received no answer that evening or the following morning. Anxious to execute my orders, I inclosed the project furnished me by your Lordship, accompanied by an official note and a private letter to M. de Talleyrand, and sent it to the Foreign Department, with directions to deliver it to M. de Talleyrand, or in his absence to the *Chief du Bureau*. It was delivered to M. Durand, who promised to give it to his chief.—At half past four, I went myself to M. de Talleyrand; I was told that the family was in the country, and they did not know when the Minister would be in town. Half an hour after I had returned home, the packet which had been given into the hands of M. Durand, was brought to me, I believe by a servant, with a verbal Message that as M. de Talleyrand was in the country, it would be necessary that I should send it to him there. In order to defeat as much as depended upon me, *their intention of gaining time*, I wrote again to M. de Talleyrand, recapitulating the steps I had taken since the return of the Messengers; and desired Mr. Talbot, the Secretary of the Embassy, to take it himself at nine o'clock at night, when I thought M. Talleyrand would be at home, to his house at Meudon. He was not at home.—Mr. T. was told that he was at St. Cloud, and would not be back till late. He therefore left my Private Letter, with his name, and returned with the packet. At one o'clock in the morning I received a Note from M. de Talleyrand accounting for his not having been able to answer me sooner; and appointing me at twelve o'clock at the *Bureau des Relations Extérieures*. I went at the appointed time.—I gave him the Note in which was the project, on which alone a satisfactory arrangement could be framed. He read them with apparent attention, and after some time he asked me if I felt myself authorized by my instructions to concede with him a Convention, framed on the basis of my project, or indeed extending that basis, since the first Article of it would be the perpetual possession of Malta to England, in return for a consideration. I told him I most certainly was not authorized to enter into engagement of such a nature, which would make the negotiation one of exchange, instead of a demand of satisfaction and security. To this he replied, that the satisfaction and security which we required was Malta, and that this we obtained. That the First Consul could not accede to what he considered by the public and by Europe, as the effect of coercion, but if it were possible to make the draft palatable, did I think myself justifiable in refusing to do so? I

told him that acting in strict compliance with my instructions, I could have no need of justification, and that I came to him with the determination of abiding strictly by them. He contended, that by communicating a project, I merely stated on what grounds we would be willing to conclude; and that a counter-project, founded on the basis of giving us what we required, could not be refused a fair discussion. To this, I urged the resolution of his Majesty's Ministers, to avoid every thing which could protract the negociation. That I saw no other means of acting up to those views, than by making my stand on the project at all events, I urged him repeatedly to explain himself more fully on the nature of the demand which he should make for Malta, *but he could not, or would not explain himself.* After much contest, it was agreed that the proposal should be submitted to me in the course of a few hours.

The remainder of this day passed without receiving any communication from M. de Talleyrand.

At two, I renewed my demand of passports, and was told I would have them immediately. They arrived at five o'clock, and I propose setting out as soon as the Carriages are ready.

No. 69.—Extract of a Dispatch from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, May 9, 1803.

The Messenger Silvester is arrived with your Lordship's dispatches, of 7th May.

As soon as I received your Lordship's instructions, I prepared a translated Copy of the project furnished me by your Lordship, and a short Note with which it is my intention to accompany the communication. I then sent a person to M. de Talleyrand, to know when I could see him, and I was informed that he was at St. Cloud. I soon after learnt that he was gone there in consequence of the accident which happened yesterday to the First Consul. I understand that no bad consequences are likely to ensue, and that he is able to transact business. I cannot, however, expect to see M. Talleyrand before to-morrow morning.

Translation of first inclosure in No. 70.

The undersigned, his Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, &c. having transmitted to his court the proposal which was made to him by the Minister for foreign affairs on the 3d instant, has just received orders to transmit to his Excellency the accompanying project of a convention, founded on the only basis which his Majesty conceives, under the existing circumstances, to be susceptible of a definitive and amicable arrangement. The Minister for foreign affairs will not fail to observe to what degree his Majesty has endeavoured to conciliate the security of his interests with the dignity of the First Consul.

(Signed)

WHITWORTH.

Translation

Translation of the second inclosure in No. 76.

PROJECT.

I. The French Government shall engage to make no opposition to the Cession of the island of Lampedosa to His Majesty by the King of the two Sicilies.

II. In consequence of the present state of the Island of Lampedosa, His Majesty shall remain in possession of the Island of Malta until such arrangements shall be made by him as may enable His Majesty to occupy Lampedosa as a naval station, after which period the Island of Malta shall be given up to the inhabitants and acknowledged as an independent State.

III. The territories of the Batavian Republic shall be evacuated by the French forces within one month after the conclusion of a Convention founded on the principles of this project.

IV. The King of Etruria and the Italian and Ligurian Republics, shall be acknowledged by his Majesty.

V. Switzerland shall be evacuated by the French forces.

VI. A suitable territorial provision shall be assigned to the King of Sardinia in Italy.

SECRET ARTICLE.

His Majesty shall not be required by the French Government to evacuate the Island of Malta until after the expiration of ten years.

Articles IV. V. and VI. may be entirely omitted, or must all be inserted.

Translation of third Inclosure in No. 70)

Paris, May 10, 1803.

Sir—In order not to lose an instant of so precious a time, I have the honour to convey to you the Project which I have received from my Court, with the Note which accompanies it.

(Signed) WHITWORTH.

To His Excellency M. de Talleyrand, &c. &c.

(The fourth Inclosure in No. 70.)

[States the pains Lord Whitworth had taken to make the communication to the French Minister, and concludes as follows]:

In this state of things, since your Excellency does not give me an opportunity of making you this communication, I have no other alternative than to give it in charge to Mr. Talbot, Secretary to the Embassy. He will have the honour to deliver to you the Project of a convention, which, I hope, will serve as a basis to an amicable arrangement between our two Governments.—I must set out on my journey for England on Thursday morning if the negociation is not favourably terminated before that time.

(Signed) WHITWORTH.

The fifth inclosure

is merely a renewal of the demand for passports.

(Signed) WHITWORTH.

DECLA-

DECLARATION.

His majesty's earnest endeavours for the preservation of peace having failed of success, he entertains the fullest confidence that he shall receive the same support from his parliament, and that the same zeal and spirit will be manifested by his people, which he has experienced on every occasion when the honour of his crown has been attacked, or the essential interests of his dominions have been endangered.

During the whole course of the negotiations which led to the preliminary and definitive treaties of peace between his majesty and the French republic, it was his majesty's sincere desire, not only to put an end to the hostilities which subsisted between the two countries, but to adopt such measures, and to concur in such propositions, as might most effectually contribute to consolidate the general tranquility of Europe. The same motives by which his majesty was actuated during the negotiations for peace, have since invariably governed his conduct. As soon as the treaty of Amiens was concluded, his majesty's courts were open to the people of France for every purpose of legal redress; all sequestrations were taken off their property—all prohibitions on their trade which had been imposed during the war were removed, and they were placed, in every respect, on the same footing with regard to commerce and intercourse, as the inhabitants of any other state in amity with his majesty, with which there existed no treaty of commerce.

To a system of conduct thus open, liberal, and friendly, the proceedings of the French government afford the most striking contrast. The prohibitions which had been placed on the commerce of his majesty's subjects during the war, have been enforced with increased strictness and severity; violence has been offered in several instances to their vessels and their property; and in no case has justice been afforded to those who may have been aggrieved in consequence of such acts, nor has any satisfactory answer been given to the repeated representations made by his majesty's ministers or ambassador at Paris. Under such circumstances, when his majesty's subjects were not suffered to enjoy the common advantages of peace within the territories of the French republic, and the countries dependent upon it, the French government had recourse to the extraordinary measure of sending over to this country a number of persons for the professed purpose of residing in the most considerable sea-port towns of Great Britain and Ireland, in the character of commercial agents or consuls. These persons could have no pretensions to be acknowledged in that character, as the right of being so acknowledged, as well as all the privileges attached to such a situation, could only be derived from a commercial treaty; and no treaty of that description was in existence between his majesty and the French republic.

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There was consequently too much reason to suppose, that the real object of their mission was by no means of a commercial nature, and this suspicion was confirmed, not only by the circumstance that some of them were military men, but by the actual discovery, that several of them were furnished with instructions to obtain the soundings of the harbours, and to procure military surveys of the places where it was intended they should reside. His majesty felt it to be his duty to prevent their departure to their respective places of destination, and represented to the French government the necessity of withdrawing them; and it cannot be denied, that the circumstances under which they were sent, and the instructions which were given to them, ought to be considered as decisive indications of the dispositions and intentions of the government by whom they were employed.

The conduct of the French government, with respect to the commercial intercourse between the two countries, must therefore be considered as ill suited to a state of peace, and their proceedings in their more general political relations, as well as in those which immediately concern his majesty's dominions, appear to have been altogether inconsistent with every principle of good faith, moderation, and justice. His majesty had entertained hopes, in consequence of the repeated assurances and professions of the French government, that they might have been induced to adopt a system of policy which, if it had not inspired other powers with confidence, might at least have allayed their jealousies. If the French government had really appeared to be actuated by a due attention to such a system; if their dispositions had proved to be essentially pacific, allowances would have been made for the situation in which a new government must be placed after so dreadful and extensive a convulsion as that which has been produced by the French revolution. But his majesty has unfortunately had too much reason to observe and to lament, that the system of violence, aggression, and aggrandizement which characterized the proceedings of the different governments of France during the war, has been continued with as little disguise since its termination. They have continued to keep a French army in Holland against the will, and in defiance of the remonstrances of the Batavian government, and in repugnance to the letter of three solemn treaties. They have, in a period of peace, invaded the territory, and violated the independence of the Swiss nation, in defiance of the treaty of Luneville, which had stipulated the independence of their territory, and the right of the inhabitants to chuse their own form of government. They have annexed to the dominions of France, Piedmont, Parma, and Placentia, and the island of Elba, without allotting any provision to the King of Sardinia, whom they have despoiled of the most valuable part of his territory, though they were bound, by a solemn en-

gement to the Emperor of Russia, to attend to his interests and to provide for his establishment. It may, indeed, with truth be asserted, that the period which has elapsed since the conclusion of the definitive treaty, has been marked with one continued series of aggression, violence, and insult on the part of the French government.

In the month of October last, his majesty was induced, in consequence of the earnest solicitation of the Swiss nation, to make an effort, by a representation to the French government, to avert the evils which were then impending over that country. This representation was couched in the most temperate terms; and measures were taken by his majesty for ascertaining, under the circumstances which then existed, the real situation and wishes of the Swiss Cantons, as well as the sentiments of the other cabinets of Europe. His majesty learned, however, with the utmost regret, that no disposition to counteract these repeated infractions of treaties and acts of violence was manifested by any of the powers most immediately interested in preventing them; and his majesty therefore felt that, with respect to these objects, his single efforts could not be expected to produce any considerable advantage to those in whose favour they might be exerted.

It was about this time that the French government first distinctly advanced the principle, that his majesty had no right to complain of the conduct, or to interfere with the proceedings, of France, on any point which did not form a part of the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens. That treaty was unquestionably founded upon the same principle as every other antecedent treaty or convention, on the assumption of the state of possession and of engagements subsisting at the time of its conclusion; and if that state of possession and of engagements is materially affected by the voluntary act of any of the parties, so as to prejudice the condition on which the other party has entered into the contract, the change so made, may be considered as operating virtually as a breach of the treaty itself, and as giving the party aggrieved a right to demand satisfaction or compensation for any substantial difference which such acts may have effected in their relative situations; but whatever may be the principle on which the treaty is to be considered as founded, there is indisputably a general law of nations, which, though liable to be limited, explained, or restrained by conventional law, is antecedent to it, and is that law or rule of conduct to which all sovereigns and states have been accustomed to appeal, where conventional law is admitted to have been silent.

The treaty of Amiens, and every other treaty, in providing for the objects to which it is particularly directed, does not therefore assume or imply an indifference to all other objects which are not specified in its stipulations, much less does it adjudge them to be of a nature to be left to the will and caprice

price of the violent and the powerful. The justice of the cause is alone a sufficient ground to warrant the interposition of any of the powers of Europe in the differences which may arise between other states, and the application and extent of that just interposition is to be determined solely by considerations of prudence. These principles can admit of no dispute; but if the new and extraordinary pretensions advanced by the French government, to exclude his majesty from any right to interfere with respect to the concerns of other powers, unless they made a specific part of the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens, was that which it was possible to maintain, those powers would have a right, at least, to claim the benefit of this principle, in every case of difference between the two countries. The indignation of all Europe must surely then be excited by the declarations of the French government, that, in the event of hostilities, these very powers who were no party to the treaty of Amiens, and who were not allowed to derive any advantage from the remonstrances of his majesty in their behalf, are nevertheless to be made the victims of a war which is alleged to arise out of the same treaty, and are to be sacrificed in a contest which they not only have not occasioned, but which they have had no means whatever of preventing.

His majesty judged it most expedient, under the circumstances which then affected Europe, to abstain from a recurrence to hostilities on account of the views of ambition and acts of aggression manifested by France on the continent; yet an experience of the character and dispositions of the French government could not fail to impress his majesty with a sense of the necessity of increased vigilance for guarding the rights and dignity of his crown, and in protecting the interests of his people.

Whilst his majesty was actuated by these sentiments, he was called upon by the French government to evacuate the Island of Malta.—His majesty had manifested, from the moment of the signature of the definitive treaty, an anxious disposition to carry into full effect the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens relative to that island. As soon as he was informed that an election of a grand master had taken place, under the auspices of the Emperor of Russia and that it had been agreed by the different priories assembled at St. Petersburg to acknowledge the person whom the court of Rome should select out of those who had been named by them to be grand master of the order of St. John, his majesty proposed to the French government, for the purpose of avoiding any difficulties which might arise in the execution of the arrangement, to acknowledge that election to be valid, and when, in the month of August, the French government applied to his majesty to permit the Neapolitan troops to be sent to the island of Malta, as a preliminary measure for preventing any unnecessary

unnecessary delay, his majesty consented without hesitation to this proposal, and gave directions for the admission of the Neapolitan troops into the island. His majesty had thus shewn his disposition not only to throw no obstacle in the way of the execution of the treaty, but, on the contrary, to facilitate the execution of it by every means in his power. His majesty cannot, however, admit, that at any period since the conclusion of the treaty of Amiens, the French government have had a right to call upon him, in conformity to the stipulations of that treaty, to withdraw his forces from the island of Malta. At the time when this demand was made by the French government, several of the most important stipulations of the arrangement respecting Malta remained unexecuted: the election of a grand master had not been carried into effect — The tenth article had stipulated that the independence of the island should be placed under the guarantee and protection of Great Britain, France, Austria, Russia, Spain, and Prussia. The Emperor of Germany had acceded to the guarantee, but only on condition of a like accession on the part of the other powers specified in the article. The Emperor of Russia had refused his accession, except on the condition that the Maltese langue should be abrogated; and the King of Prussia had given no answer whatever to the application which had been made to him to accede to the arrangement. But the fundamental principle, upon the existence of which depended the execution of the other parts of the article, had been defeated by the changes which had taken place in the constitution of the order since the conclusion of the treaty of peace. It was to the order of St. John of Jerusalem that his majesty was, by the first stipulation of the 10th article, bound to restore the island of Malta. The order is defined to consist of those langues which were in existence at the time of the conclusion of the treaty: The three French langues having been abolished, and a Maltese langue added to the institution. The order consisted, therefore, at that time of the following langues, of Arragon, Castile, Germany, Bavaria, and Russia. Since the conclusion of the definitive treaty, the langues of Arragon and Castile have been separated from the order by Spain, a part of the Italian langue has been abolished by the annexation of Piedmont and Parma to France. There is strong reason to believe that it has been in contemplation to sequester the property of the Bavarian langue, and the intention has been avowed of keeping the Russian langues within the dominions of the emperor.

Under these circumstances the order of St. John cannot now be considered as that body to which, according to the stipulations of the treaty, the island was to be restored; and the funds indispensably necessary for its support, and for the maintenance of the independence of that island, have been

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nearly, if not wholly, sequestered. Even if this had arisen from circumstances which it was not in the power of any of the contracting parties to the treaty to controul, his majesty would nevertheless have had a right to defer the evacuation of the island by his forces, until such time as an equivalent arrangement had been concluded for the preservation of the independence of the order and of the island. But if these changes have taken place in consequence of any acts of the other parties to the treaty; if the French government shall appear to have proceeded upon a system of rendering the order whose independence they had stipulated, incapable of maintaining that independence, his majesty's right to continue in the occupation of the island, under such circumstances, will hardly be contested. It is indisputable, that the revenues of the two Spanish langues have been withdrawn from the order of his Catholic majesty; a part of the Italian langue has in fact been abolished by France, through the unjust annexation of Piedmont and Parma, and Placentia, to the French territory. The elector of Bavaria has been instigated by the French government to sequester the property of the order within his territories; and it is certain that they have not only sanctioned, but encouraged the idea of the propriety of separating the Russian langues from the remainder of the order. As the conduct of the governments of France and Spain, have therefore in some instances directly, and in others indirectly, contributed to the changes which have taken place in the order, and thus destroyed its means of supporting its independence, it is to those governments, and not to his majesty, that the non-execution of the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens must be ascribed.

Such would be the just conclusion, if the tenth article of that treaty were considered as an arrangement by itself. It must be observed, however, that this article forms a part only of a treaty of peace, the whole of which is connected together, and the stipulations of which must, upon a principle common to all treaties, be construed as having a reference to each other.

His majesty was induced by the treaty of peace to consent to abandon, and to restore to the Order of St. John the island of Malta, on condition of its independence and neutrality.—But a further condition which must necessarily be supposed to have had considerable influence with his majesty in inducing him to make so important a concession, was the acquiescence of the French government in an arrangement for the security of the Levant, by the eighth and ninth articles in the treaty, stipulating the integrity of the Turkish empire, and the independence of the Ionian islands. His majesty has however, since learnt, that the French government

ment have entertained views hostile to both these objects ; and that they have even suggested the idea of a partition of the Turkish empire. These views must now be manifest to all the world, from the official publication of the report of Colonel Sebastiani ; from the conduct of that officer, and of the other French agents in Egypt, Syria, and the Ionian Islands, and from the distinct admission of the First Consul himself, in his communication with Lord Whitworth. His majesty was, therefore, warranted in considering it to be the determination of the French government to violate those articles of the treaty of peace, which stipulated for the integrity and independence of the Turkish empire, and of the Ionian Islands, and consequently he would not be justified in evacuating the island of Malta, without receiving some other security, which might equally provide for those important objects. His majesty accordingly feels that he has an incontestible claim, in consequence of the conduct of France since the treaty of peace, and with reference to the objects which made part of the stipulations of that treaty, to refuse, under the present circumstances, to relinquish the possession of the island of Malta.

Yet notwithstanding this right, so clear and so unquestionable, the alternative presented by the French government to his majesty, in language the most peremptory and menacing, was the evacuation of Malta, or the renewal of war. If the views of ambition and aggrandizement, which have thus been manifested by the French government since the conclusion of the treaty of peace, have in so very particular a manner attracted the attention of his majesty, it has been equally impossible for him not to feel, and not to notice, the repeated indignities which have been offered by that government to his crown, and to his people.

The report of Colonel Sebastiani contains the most unwarrantable insinuations and charges against his majesty's government, against the officer who commanded his forces in Egypt, and against the British army in that quarter.—This paper cannot be considered as the publication of a private individual ; it has been avowed, and indeed bears evidence upon the face of it, that it is the official report of an accredited agent, published by the authority of the government to which it was addressed, who thereby have given it their express sanction.

This report had been published a very short time, when another indignity was offered to this country in the communication of the First Consul of France to the Legislative Body. In this communication he presumes to affirm, in the character of chief magistrate of that country, " That Great Britain cannot singly contend against the power of France ;" an assertion as unfounded as it is indecent, disproved by the events of many wars, and by none more than by those of the war which has been recently concluded. Such an assertion, advanced in
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the most solemn official act of a government, and thereby meant to be avowed to all the powers of Europe, can be considered in no other light than as a defiance publicly offered to his majesty, and to a brave and powerful people, who are both willing and able to defend his just rights, and those of their country, against every insult and aggression.

The conduct of the First Consul to his majesty's ambassador at his audience, in presence of the ministers of most of the sovereigns and states of Europe, furnishes another instance of provocation on the part of the French government, which it would be improper not to notice on the present occasion, and the subsequent explanation of this transaction may be considered as having the effect of aggravating instead of palliating the affront.

At the very time when his majesty was demanding satisfaction and explanation on some of the points above-mentioned, the French minister at Hamburgh endeavoured to obtain the insertion in a Hamburgh paper of a most gross and opprobrious libel against his majesty; and when difficulties were made respecting the insertion of it, he availed himself of his official character of minister of the French republic, to require the publication of it by order of his government in the gazette of the senate of that town. With this requisition so made, the senate of Hamburgh were induced to comply; and thus has the independence of that town been violated, and a free state made the instrument, by the menace of the French government, of propagating throughout Europe, upon their authority, the most offensive and unfounded calumnies against his majesty and his government. His majesty might add to this list of indignities, the requisition which the French government have repeatedly urged, that the laws & constitution of this country should be changed relative to the liberty of the press. His majesty might likewise add the calls which the French government have on several occasions made upon him to violate the laws of hospitality with respect to persons who had found an asylum within his dominions, and against whose conduct no charge whatever has at any time been substantiated. It is impossible to reflect on these different proceedings, and the course which the French government have thought proper to adopt respecting them, without the thorough conviction that they are not the effect of accident; but that they form a part of a system which has been adopted for the purpose of degrading, vilifying, and insulting his majesty and his government.


Under all these insults and provocations, his majesty, not without a due sense of his dignity, had proceeded with every degree of temper and moderation to obtain satisfaction and redress, while he has neglected no means consistent with his honour and the safety of his dominions, to induce the government of France to concede to him, what is, in his judgment, absolutely necessary for the future tranquility of Europe. His efforts in
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 this respect have proved abortive, and he has therefore judged it necessary to order his ambassador to leave Paris. In having recourse to this proceeding, it has been his majesty's object to put an end to the fruitless discussions which have too long subsisted between the two governments, and to close a period of suspense peculiarly injurious to the subjects of his majesty.

But though the provocations which his majesty has received might entitle him to larger claims than those which he has advanced, yet anxious to prevent calamities which might thus be extended to every part of Europe, he is still willing, as far as is consistent with his own honour, and the interests of his people, to afford every facility to any just and honourable arrangement, by which such evils may be averted. He has therefore, no difficulty in declaring to all Europe, that notwithstanding all the changes which have taken place since the treaty of peace, notwithstanding the extension of the power of France, in repugnance to that treaty, and to the spirit of peace itself, his majesty will not avail himself of these circumstances, to demand in compensation all that he is intitled to require, but will be ready to concur, even now, in an arrangement by which satisfaction shall be given to him, for the indignities which have been offered to his crown and to his people, and substantial security afforded against further encroachments on the part of France.

His majesty has thus distinctly and unreservedly stated the reasons of those proceedings to which he has found himself compelled to resort. He is actuated by no disposition to interfere in the internal concerns of any other state; by no projects of conquest and aggrandizement; but solely by a sense of what is due to the honour of his crown, and the interests of his people, and by an anxious desire to obstruct the further progress of a system, which if not resisted, may prove fatal to every part of the civilized world.

THE END.



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